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Arbitration With Government
By Jack I. Garvey*©
I.

INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is today employed for dispute resolution
well beyond its origins in private contractual relations. It is
now widely adopted by both state and federal governments
for contracting with the private sector, government to
government relationships, both at state and federal levels,
state governments’ engagement with federal agencies and
their bureaucracies, and for the contractual and treaty
relationships between the United States and other nations.1
This broadening engagement of government with
arbitral process has generally occurred with, at best, only
sporadic and contextual examination of whether there are
unique considerations that distinguish arbitration from its
private sector employment. This article will seek to draw,
from the variety of contexts of arbitration with government,
these special considerations for all lawyers engaged in
arbitration with government.
There is a need to understand these unique concerns
not only to maximize the societal benefits arbitration affords,
but to understand when government’s involvement imposes
special limits on the utility and value of arbitration. This is
necessary to ensure not only that arbitration can be
successfully employed to serve public policy, but also to
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law, J.D. Harvard
Law School, 1968; AB Harvard College, 1964. My thanks to Laura Odujinrin
for the consistent excellence of her research assistance.
1
Stephen Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and
Strengthening the Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
521, 522–74 (2000); Ksenia Polonskaya, Diversity in the Investor-State
Arbitration: Intersectionality Must Be A Part of the Coversation, 19
MELBOURNE J. OF INT'L L. 259, 260–97 (2018); Stavros Brekoulakis,
International Arbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law, 36
Fordham Int’l L.J. 745, 745–87 (2013).
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prevent its weaponization for engagement to subvert the
public interest government is supposed to secure. 2
We see ambivalence about the value of arbitration
with government, reflected in the hesitancy with which U.S.
governmental agencies have moved in implementing arbitral
process, even when mandated by legislation.3 The reason,
assuredly, is the perception that arbitration may sacrifice the
advantages other dispute resolution affords for
government—domesticly, legal process of trial and appellate
courts, and internationally, diplomacy. There is the
pervasive perception that arbitration imposes undue risk of
diminishing or negating the public interest that government
is supposed to secure.4 How this occurs and how it may best
be prevented is also the subject of this article.
Arbitration, agreed by way of a contract clause or
ad hoc after a dispute has developed, is therefore, at bottom,
a political as well as legal matter. For the government
lawyer, as representative of the state, the choice to arbitrate
is not simply a choice of legal process, but how best to meet
governmental policy objectives. For the lawyer at issue with
government, the choice to arbitrate may be the means to
mitigate the otherwise overwhelming resources and power
of government. The choice to arbitrate, and in what form,
must therefore be evaluated for the government lawyer and
2

David Chriki, Strapping Down Regulatory Space with Investment Arbitration:
A New Breed of International SLAPPS, 51 GEO. J. INT'L L. 415, 416–19, 428–
29 (2020).
3
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C.A. §§ 1–16 (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 116–58); Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571–84
(1996); see Daniel Marcus & Jeffrey M. Senger, ADR and the Federal
Government: Not Such Strange Bedfellows After All, 66 MO. L. REV. 709, 710–
12 (2001); Charles Pou, Jr., Federal Agency ADR: Turning Square Corners to
Meet Real Challenges, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1020–37 (2008).
4
It is a common view that “the major arbitration issue of our time” is “the
imposition on consumers and employees of arbitration agreements that
effectively deprive them of the ability to vindicate their federal- or state-law
rights.” Michael J. Yelnosky, Fully Federalizing the Federal Arbitration Act,
90 OR. L. REV. 729, 736 (2012).
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the lawyers representing private interest working in the
trenches of dispute resolution with government, by weighing
the strategic advantages and disadvantages of arbitration,
against alternative strategies for dispute resolution, and to
know what considerations should determine the right
choices.
II.

ADVANTAGES
AND
DISADVANTAGES
OF
ARBITRATION IN RELATION TO DISPUTE
RESOLUTION WITH GOVERNMENT
A.
THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
What, then, are the advantages and disadvantages?
Why, especially, should government, dressed with deep
pockets and the emblems of public interest, abandon the
alternative prerogatives of sovereignty to be obtained
through constitutionally established adjudicatory process?
There is, of course, the conventional wisdom about
arbitration: that arbitration, irrespective of the parties, is
cheaper, faster, less encumbered by evidentiary and
procedural rules, and broad in its discovery. The choice of
arbitration also can serve to design the process of dispute
resolution to the distinctive nature of any dispute, as for
example, imposing limits on the litigable issues, discovery
and evidence, and even available remedies.
The choice to arbitrate is generally also seen as
assuring a fundamentally greater dimension of finality than
other means of dispute resolution.5 This follows because the
grounds for appeal of an arbitral award are so limited,
offering considerable avoidance of much of the risk, time,
and costs of appeal.6 This latter advantage of arbitration may
5

Peter Hirst, Do Arbitration Users Really Value Finality?, KLUWER
ARBITRATION
BLOG
(June
4,
2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/06/04/arbitration-usersreally-value-finality/.
6
Section 10 of the FAA, for example, echoed in most arbitral rules, permits the
court to vacate an arbitration award only: (a)(1) “where the award was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means;” (a)(2) “where there was evident
partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;” and (a)(3) “where
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be particularly advantageous for arbitration involving
government and its agencies, when time is critical, as for
example environmental and water rights disputes.
Another item of the conventional wisdom about
arbitration, that the government attorney would be well
advised to take into account, is that arbitration can provide
greater opportunity to secure a decision-maker known to
have knowledge, and also experience, in the field of law and
controversy at issue. This is obviously true in contradistinction to the politically appointed judge or however
well-vetted jury. In contrast to the chance and often arbitrary
nature of assignment to a litigation judge—who may or may
not have the requisite expertise to adequately understand a
dispute—arbitration affords all parties the opportunity to
weigh in on the arbitrator’s appointment, and accordingly
the arbitrators qualifications.7 Indeed, the value of this
opportunity goes well beyond the technical or legal expertise
of the decision-maker, to the even more fundamental and
important questions of competence and minimization of
bias.8 The professional competence of the litigation judge
assigned one’s case is the risk any lawyer runs in going to
court. It may be of critical value to avoid that risk—
particularly for government lawyers often charged with
politically significant cases.9 The ability to vet and choose
the decision-maker that arbitration affords, accordingly, is of
special value.
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing,
upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehaviour by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced.” 9 U.S.C.A. § 10 (2002); see also C A L .
C I V . P R O C . C O D E § 128.6 (repealed 2011).
7
Arbitrator, Judge, or Jury; Pick Your Poison, SMITH AMUNDSEN (May 24,
2017), https://www.salawus.com/insights-alerts-ArbitratorJudgeorJury.html.
8
Matt Hoffman, The Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration vs. Court
ARENSBERG
(Feb.
13,
2020),
Litigation,
TUCKER
https://www.tuckerlaw.com/2015/02/13/advantages-disadvantages-arbitrationvs-court-litigation/.
9
Joseph R. Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 64
CAL. L. REV. 678, 682 (1976).
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B.

THE NAIVETE OF THE CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM
The conventional wisdom about arbitration,
however, requires significant qualification—especially as to
its most acclaimed attributes—when considered in the
context of arbitration with government. Arbitration is
usually faster and cheaper—but not necessarily so.10
Arbitration in general results in substantial reduction in time
and costs relative to the discovery and motion practice that
burdens court litigation.11 But particularly for arbitration
with government—and in general—as the use of arbitration
has expanded throughout the global economy, it has become
increasingly more likely that complex substantial, economic,
and political interests are at stake in arbitration.12 This added
complexity often belies the conventional wisdom of “faster
and cheaper.”
The cost and efficiency contrast with litigation is
less pronounced the larger and more complex the case. As
the stakes and complexity are greater, arbitration is more
likely to be infused with the more formal procedures of
litigation, such as discovery, motions practice, submission of
briefs, and written awards.13 This has importantly altered the
character of arbitration in ways that contradict the
conventional wisdom.14
10

Duane Horning, Should You Agree to Arbitration?, CALIFORNIA BUSINESS
LAW GROUP (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.cblg.biz/resources/arbitration/shouldyou-agree-to-arbitration-/.
11
Horning, supra note 10.
12
See generally Guide to International Arbitration, LATHAM & WATKINS
(2019),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtleadership/guide-to-internationalarbitration-2017.
13
Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why It
Doesn’t Work and Why It Does, HARVARD BUS. REV., May–June 1994.
Available at https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-dispute-resolution-why-itdoesnt-work-and-why-it-does.
14
It is concerning that arbitration is commonly just as costly and time
consuming as court litigation, and increasingly dominated by legal formalities;
see generally, Alain Frécon, Delaying Tactics in Arbitration, 59 DISP. RESOL.
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It is important to view with skepticism the most
common proposition of the conventional wisdom about
arbitration—that it is faster and more cost effective. That
proposition may or may not be true, depending on the scope
and import of the matter at hand.
There is indeed abundant demonstration, that for
any particular matter, arbitration is often neither faster nor
more cost effective than other modalities of dispute
resolution.15 This may be so for any number of reasons. One
of the most significant reasons—at least in U.S. arbitration—
is that one of the few bases on which an arbitrator’s award
can be reversed is when the arbitrator has refused to entertain
relevant evidence.16
In general, arbitrators are accorded broad discretion
as to evidentiary decisions in favor of expeditious hearing.17
But courts do find due process violations where arbitrators
exclude material evidence, and this may be a basis for a court
to vacate an arbitral award.18 So—professional ethics
J. 40 (2005); Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration, 58
DISP. RESOL. J. 37 (2003); Perry A. Zirkel & Andriy Krahmal, Creeping
Legalism in Grievance Arbitration: Fact or Fiction?, 16 OHIO. ST. J. DISP.
RESOL. 243 (2001).
15
See generally, Frécon, supra note 14; Phillips, supra note 14; Zirkel &
Krahmal, supra note 14.
16
See, e.g., Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552, 582 n.4, U.S. 576
(2008) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).; Royal All. Assocs., Inc., v. Liebhaber, 2
Cal. App. 5th 1092, 1107–08 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
17
See e.g., Legion Ins. Co. v. Ins. Gen. Agency, Inc., 822 F.2d, 541, 543 (5th
Cir. 1987); Reed & Martin, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 439 F.2d 1268
(2d Cir. 1971); Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration
Awards, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 56, 70 (2014); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4); see, e.g.,
American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, Rule R30(b); Sherrock Brothers, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC, 260
Fed.Appx. 497, 502 (3rd Cir. 2008).
18
See, e.g., Confinco, Inc. v. Bakrie & Bros., 395 F.Supp. 613, 615–16
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Harvey Aluminum v. United Steel Workers of America, 263
F.Supp. 488 (C.D. Cal. 1967); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §
10(a)(1)–(4) (2002) (“[i]n any of the following cases the United States court in
and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating
the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration . . . where the
arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon
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notwithstanding—the inclination of the arbitrator, in order
to avoid reversal of his or her award, is to admit into the
proceedings most if not all evidence offered—however
tenuous its relationship to the issue—resulting in significant
impacts on costs and speed.19
Furthermore, for the arbitrator, the exaggerated
admission of evidence is compounded by the reality that the
arbitrator is typically paid on an hourly or daily basis.20 The
arbitrator may be inclined to accept the opportunity that
“relevance” presents in order to run up additional time. To
the contrary, the salaried judge—whose salary is the same
no matter how heavy or light the caseload—is inclined to do
all he or she can to lighten the caseload.21 Thus, when there
is a dispute as to the scope of arbitral jurisdiction, relegating
all possible issues to arbitration improves the income of the
arbitrator and lightens the caseload for the judge—an
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
the controversy.”).
19
This can extend the time and cost considerably beyond a comparable
litigation. Adjudication before a litigation judge is much more constricted by
rules limiting the admission of evidence – for example, the rule precluding
hearsay evidence where a witness would state what he claims to have heard
from someone else. Compare Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures, Rule 34 (2013 Am. Arbitration Ass’n) (stating “[c]onformity to
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary . . . [t]he arbitrator shall determine
the admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and may
exclude evidence deemed by the arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant”), with
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures, Rule 32 (2014 JAMS)
(stating “[s]trict conformity to the rules of evidence is not required, except that
the Arbitrator shall apply applicable law relating to privileges and work
product. The Arbitrator shall consider evidence that he or she finds relevant
and material to the dispute, giving the evidence such weight as is appropriate.
The Arbitrator may be guided in that determination by principles contained in
the Federal Rules of Evidence or any other applicable rules of evidence. The
Arbitrator may limit testimony to exclude evidence that would be immaterial or
unduly repetitive, provided that all Parties are afforded the opportunity to
present material and relevant evidence”).
20
Costs of Arbitration, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA228_Costs_
of_Arbitration.pdf, at 2.
21
Judicial
Compensation,
UNITED
STATES
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation.
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attractive disposition for both. Moreover—as to the
consequences of cost—it is important to keep in mind that
each party is paying up to three arbitrators by the hour or by
the day, along with substantial administrative fees when an
arbitral institution is involved. In judicial litigation, of
course, the state—i.e., the citizen-taxpayer—pays both for
the justice system and the judge.
Another item of the conventional wisdom about
arbitration being superior to judicial litigation that the
government lawyer needs to consider more critically is that
arbitration can better serve to preserve a working
relationship between the claimant and respondent when
resolving a particular dispute.22 The effort to capitalize on
this advantage is well illustrated in private and governmental
context by the standard construction contract of the
American Institute of Architects, wherein the architect is in
effect designated as an arbitrator charged to resolve disputes
between owner and contractor such that construction can
proceed to completion—notwithstanding the disputes that
almost invariably arise before arriving at completion.23
However, it is the common experience that once the
contractor and owner hire lawyers, the relationship between
contractor and owner is destroyed, rarely allowing its

22

Stephen S. Strick, Alternative Dipsute Resolution, ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION
SERVICES
(Last
accessesd
Mar.
2021),
https://www.arbitratemediate.com/alternative-dispute-resolution.
23
Under the American Institute of Architects standard form contracts, the
architect serves as the initial arbiter of disputes between contractors and owners.
If the architect arbitrator’s decision is unacceptable, the standard form contract
then calls for formal mediation, followed by arbitration. This method of dispute
resolution is intended to resolve disputes “without delay and expense of
courtroom proceedings.” You and Your Architect, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
ARCHITECTS, 7 (2007), https://aiala.com/wp-content/uploads/You-and-YourArchitect.pdf; see also Richard H. Steen, Construction Industry ADR: Setting
the Standard, 217-Oct. N.J. LAW. MAG. 23, 24 (2002); 2 ALVIN L. ARNOLD &
MARSHALL TRACHT, CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FINANCING § 9:63
(Thompson West, 3d ed. 2009).
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reconstruction.24 The project, whatever it may be, simply
stops while the lawyers argue and run up fees, irrespective
of the availability of an architect to serve as arbitrator.25
In governmental arbitration, stopping may result in
significant collateral damage and may not be otherwise
feasible for practical or political reasons.26 The need to get
along with the various constituencies that government
governs, and the private and governmental partners with
which government engages under contract on a continuing
basis, is one factor that makes arbitration more attractive for
government than judicial litigation.27 This can be true for
disputes between government agencies that must continue in
a cooperative relationship, for disputes between a
government agency and a public/private partnership, or
between government and an entity with which the
government necessarily has a long-term evolving
relationship.28
The conventional wisdom that arbitration can help
sustain an important relationship can be correct, and
especially advantageous for government and its agencies.
Relatedly, for arbitration involving government, arbitration
can assure greater confidentiality than litigation and thereby
24
See Cara Shimkus Hall & Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The How and Why of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: What It Means to the Architect and the Owner, 8
(2001),
AIARCHITECT
http://info.aia.org/aiarchitect/thisweek/tw0824/0824tw2rskmgmt.pdf (“Unlike
mediation, where the goal is to reach a compromise resolution, arbitration is an
adversarial process — one side opposing the other, with a neutral and
disinterested third party. . . .”).
25
Hall & Wolfe, supra note 24.
26
PAMELA ESTERMAN, MICHAEL KENNEALLY, JR. AND HOWARD PROTTER,
THE BENEFITS OF ALTRNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR RESOLVING
MUNICIPAL
DISPUTES
1
(2011),
https://nysba.org/NYSBA/Sections/Dispute%20Resolution/Dispute%20Resol
ution%20PDFs/Municipalwhitepaper12-21-2010.pdf (“When a dispute
involves a municipality, the costs of resolving it will typically be borne by the
taxpayers either directly through taxation, or indirectly through increased
insurance premiums.”).
27
See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26.
28
See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26.
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help preserve existing or long-term relationships for
government procurement and socio-economic programs.29
So facilitation of long-term relationships is one element of
the conventional wisdom about arbitration to be
acknowledged where such relationships should be
facilitated.30
But as to confidentiality facilitating arbitration, the
conventional wisdom is again short on deeper consideration
when arbitration is with the government. There is, in
general, a presumption of confidentiality in arbitration.31 All
major institutional arbitration rules guarantee the
confidentiality of arbitral hearings,32 and typically the award
is kept private, although as with all matters in arbitration, the
parties can agree otherwise.33 In commercial litigation, the
principle of confidentiality serves to secure such matters as
trade secrets and reputation, and avoiding stock impacts, and
thereby, the theory goes, encourages more candid expression
by the parties and hence more expeditious results than
courtroom litigation.34 Moreover, there may be situations,

29

See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26.
See ESTERMAN, KENNEALLY, JR. & PROTTER, supra note 26.
Alexis C. Brown, Presumption Meets Reality: An Exploration of the
Confidentiality Obligation in International Commercial Arbitration, 16 AM. U.
INT’L L.REV. 969, 970 (2001).
32
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Confidentiality in Federal Alternative
Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 83085, 83085-95,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/12/29/0033247/confidentiality-in-federal-alternative-dispute-resolution-programs
(discussing limitations on confidentiality in U.S. Federal arbitration). Dispute
resolution communications are also protected from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, or for use as evidence
in a court, 5 U.S.C. §574. As to international arbitration, see, e.g., G.A. Res.
65/22 (Dec. 6, 2011); 2010 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 21(3), 28(3)
(2010).
33
Hall & Wolfe, supra note 24 (“[T]here are no formal rules of pro- cedure or
evidence governing the actual arbitration, apart from those adopted by the
parties themselves.”).
34
Brown, supra note 31, at 972 n. 8, 1008; U.S. Department of Justice,
Confidentiality in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed.
Reg.
83085,
83085–95
(2000),
30
31
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more likely in a mixed civil–criminal context, where the
assurance of confidentiality to the parties or third parties,
may also be productive in securing information that would
otherwise be concealed from public view. The public
interest and the interests of the parties and third parties may
also be served by confidentiality where the relationship of
the parties could be disrupted and potentially destroyed by
publicity.35 For labor disputes, for example, arbitration and
the confidentiality it affords may be valued as serving
preservation of a viable employer–employee relationship
and providing a more congenial environment for employee
reinstatement.36
But should a government lawyer always prefer the
confidentiality that arbitration can more likely assure than
courtroom litigation? This should always be a threshold
question for the government lawyer, and the answer will
vary by context.
It is always tempting, of course, to extend a blanket
of confidentiality over one’s affairs, whether arising in the
office or the bedroom.37 But for a government lawyer,
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2000/12/29/0033247/confidentiality-in-federal-alternative-dispute-resolution-programs.
35
Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public
Law Arbitrators Should be Required to Issue Written, Public Opinions, 4 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 295 (2000).
36
Randall Thomas, Erin O’Hara & Kenneth Martin, Arbitration Clauses in
CEO Employment Contracts: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 63
VAND. L. REV. 959, 971 (2010).
37
See Michael Barbaro, The Daily: Silenced, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/podcasts/the-daily. Michael Barbaro of The Daily
reviews the elaborate system that has developed to silence women who level
accusations against powerful men. One of those women is Stephanie Clifford
(known as Stormy Daniels), a pornographic actress who claims to have had an
affair with American President, Donald J. Trump. Trump’s lawyer negotiated
a contract with Stephanie Clifford to prevent exposing their relationship to
public scrutiny and potential legal charges. Barbaro emphasizes that the
freedom to privately resolve disputes and avoid judicial or public scrutiny of
even the most egregious conduct has become engrained in dispute resolution at
the highest level of U.S. political and social society. Barbaro opines that the
ability to pay for zero transparency of such conduct is a system unlikely to
disappear from U.S. culture in the long-term because of its widespread use; see
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confidentiality may be vice or virtue.38 And confidentiality,
though touted in private context as expediting conflict
resolution, is generally vice for the government lawyer
working in the various arenas of public interest.39 For the
public interest, publicity and transparency are often essential
virtues, not to be avoided, but to be cherished.40
When Congress approved the 1996 amendments to
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, it sought to
strike a balance between open government and the protection
of confidentiality to facilitate and support alternative dispute
resolution.41 Consistent with this general thrust of the
amendments, the presumption was in favor of
confidentiality.42 Congress, however, also listed a number
of situations where disclosure would be permissible and a
process for securing disclosure.43 Given the case-specific
nature of the tension between confidentiality and disclosure,

also Toby Luckhurst, The Stormy Daniels-Donald Trump story explained, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 11, 2018), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43334326.
38
See Kaczmarek, supra note 35.
39
Kaczmarek, supra note 35.
40
Brown, supra note 31 at 1013-14, 1017 (stating transparency is also of value
to the arbitral process, as by improving the predictability of arbitral
proceedings). Brown, supra. at 1019 (discussing the same in training
arbitrators). Kaczmarek, supra note 35 (suggesting to create pressure to
improve the quality of arbitral awards by exposing the award and its reasoning
to critique). Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration:
A Single Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 31-32
(1986) (providing exposure to judge the qualification of arbitrators). For
lessons as to the adverse social consequences of arbitral confidentiality in
international arbitration involving governments, see Anthony Depalma, Nafta’s
Powerful Little Secret; Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far,
TIMES
(Mar.
11,
2001),
Critics
Say,
N.Y.
http//www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secretobscure-tribunals-settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html.
41
Charles Pou, Jr., Gandhi Meets Eliot Ness: 5th Circuit Ruling Raises
Concerns About Confidentiality in Federal Agency ADR, 24 ADMIN. & REGUL.
L. NEWS 5, 7 (1999).
42
Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 7.
43
Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 5.
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the result was to leave resolution of that tension to the courts,
essentially within broad parameters.44
Many states, including perhaps most prominently
California, have attempted to remove the cloak of
confidentiality (which arbitration normally affords) from
arbitration involving governmental policy, for example, by
banning forced arbitration at the workplace.45 And for the
attorney representing government in arbitration, the general
presumption should be against confidentiality. Blanket
confidentiality is normally not necessary nor appropriate to
secure public interests.46 If there is information requiring
secrecy, there is the much preferred alternative of selective
preclusion of such information from the arbitral award and
its reasoning.47
Making exceptions and denying
transparency for such reasons as ‘reputational concerns’ can
otherwise too easily become euphemisms for avoiding
disclosure of corruption and other activity that may be
harmful to the public.48 Therefore, exceptions favoring
confidentiality for governmental arbitration should be
narrowly selected and narrowly construed to prevent an
escape from public accountability. And in service of the
public interest, we must place the burden of proving the
merit of the exception in arbitration with government
squarely on the proponent of ‘confidentiality.’
44

Pou, Jr., supra note 41, at 7; see also Mark H. Grunewald, Freedom of
Information and Confidentiality Under the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 985 (1996); Admin. Conference of the U.S.,
Recommendation No. 95–96, ADR Confidentiality and the Freedom of
Information Act, 60 Fed. Reg. 43, 115 (1995).
45
See Laurence Darmiento, Judge Halts California Law Banning Forced
Arbitration at the Workplace, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019, 5:28 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-12-30/california-forcedarbitration-law-blocked; Grunewald, supra note 44 at 987.
46
Grunewald, supra note 44, at 987–9 (1996); see generally, Catherine A.
Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, Vol. 54 No. 5
U. KANSAS L. REV. 1401 (2006).
47
5 U.S.C. § 574(d); see also Grunewald, supra note 44, at 989.
48
Grunewald, supra note 44, at 987–89 (1996); see generally, Rogers, supra
note 46.
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Transparency as a transcendent principle is surely
to be commended. The devil, though, typically tends to lurk
in the details of implementation. And greater light is often
necessary to negotiate the dark. For arbitration with
government, light by example may be obtained from the
broader implementation of arbitration—for example,
modern international agreements employing arbitration for
dispute resolution for international trade and investment
agreements.49 These agreements commonly and specifically
provide guidelines for maximizing transparency in
arbitration.50
Moreover, transparency has become a
49
See George A. Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the European
Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 933
(1996).
50
An example of a recent development of standards to ensure public
accountability and transparency in arbitration are the transparency requirements
developed for the investment settlement section of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement that were developed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, stating as follows:
Article 9.24: Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings
1.
Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4, the respondent shall, after
receiving the following documents, promptly transmit them to
the non-disputing Parties and make them available to the
public:
a.
The notice of intent;
b.
The notice of arbitration;
c.
Pleadings, memorials and briefs submitted to the tribunal
by a disputing party and any written submissions
submitted pursuant to Article 9.23.2 (Conduct of the
Arbitration) and Article 9.23.3 and Article 9.28
(Consolidation);
d.
Minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, if
available; and
e.
Orders, awards and decisions of the tribunal
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Chapter 9: Investment (Jan. 26, 2016),
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaties/trans-pacificpartnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership.
The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration (the “Mauritius Convention on Transparency”) is
another leading example of provision for transparency, particularly instructive
in its detail. UNCITRAL, Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based
Investor-State Arbitration (New York, 2014) (the “Mauritius Convention on
Transparency”)
(Dec.
10,
2014),
https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/transparency.
The
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mandate for the implementation of
agreements through national law.51

Convention incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treatybased
Investor-State
Arbitration,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparenc
y.html. These rules require the following publication of documents:
Article 3. Publication of documents
1.
Subject to article 7, the following documents shall be made
available to the public: the notice of arbitration, the response
to the notice of arbitration, the statement of claim, the
statement of defense and any further written statements or
written submissions by any disputing party; a table listing all
exhibits to the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and
witness statements, if such table has been prepared for the
proceedings, but not the exhibits themselves; any written
submissions by the non-disputing Party (or Parties) to the
treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where
available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral
tribunal.
2.
Subject to article 7, expert reports and witness statements,
exclusive of the exhibits thereto, shall be made available to the
public, upon request by any person to the arbitral tribunal.
3.
Subject to article 7, the arbitral tribunal may decide, on its own
initiative or upon request from any person, and after
consultation with the disputing parties, whether and not to
make available exhibits and any other documents provided to,
or issued by the arbitral tribunal not falling within paragraphs
1 or 2 above. This may include, for example, making such
documents available at a specified time.
51
Thus, for example, the legislation for implementing the NAFTA agreement
between the United States, Canada and Mexico specified the need to ensure ‘the
fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism, to the
extent consistent with the need to protect information that is classified or
business confidential, by – (i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement,
submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made public; (ii) ensuring
that all hearings are open to the public; and (iii) establishing a mechanism for
acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from businesses, unions, and
governmental organizations.’ Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3)(H)
(2002). Bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade Agreements entered into
by the United States post-NAFTA have accordingly required that the following
documents be made available to the disputing Party(ies) and the public: the
notice of intent to submit a clam to arbitration; the notice of arbitration;
pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by any disputing
party, non-disputing Party, or amicus curiae; minutes or transcripts of hearings
of the tribunal, where available; and orders, awards and decisions of the
tribunal; see, e.g., U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 1, 3–5.
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Accordingly, bilateral Investment Treaties and Free Trade
Agreements entered into by the United States have provided
helpful reference points for developing and implementing
critically important transparency.52
III.

DRAFTING THE AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE
As the above qualifications of the conventional
wisdom about arbitration indicate, the challenge for the
government attorney is to assure that the choice to arbitrate
will secure the advantages of arbitration, but not to the
detriment of distinctly governmental objectives of public
interest.53 The practical steps in meeting this challenge
begin with drafting the arbitration agreement and
establishing its scope.54
The drafting may be designed to cover an entire
contractual relationship, or particular disputes.55 It may be

Canada has approved a similar and guidelines in Canada’s model Foreign
Investment Protection Agreement issued in 2003; see Canada’s Model Foreign
Investment
Protection
Agreement
at
Art.
38–39,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investmentagreements/treaty-files/2820/download.
52
Post-Nafta International Investment Agreements have included, for example,
that “(T)he tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public” U.S.-Chile Free
Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 2, that the tribunal shall “have the authority to
accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a person or entity that is
not a disputing party.” U.S.–Chile Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.19, ¶ 3 (June
6, 2003); U.S.–Colombia Free Trade Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 3 (May 15,
2012); U.S.–Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Art. 10.20, ¶ 3 (Apr. 12, 2006).
Submissions in NAFTA and CAFTA–DR (The Dominican Republic–Central
America FTA) as well as awards, can be found on the websites of the respective
countries. Hearings that can provide further enlightenment have been made
public, either by closed-circuit TV or webcast.
53
See generally, Rogers, supra note 46; Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §
3802(b)(3)(H) (2002); Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Chapter 9:
Investment (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-weare/treaties/trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacificpartnership; see also Grunewald, supra note 44.
54
Blackaby, “Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration,” 6th ed., Oxford
Univ. Press, 1–5, 35–39 (2015).
55
Blackaby, supra note 54, at 35–38.
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prospective, drafting the clause before a dispute has arisen,
or for ad hoc arbitration after a dispute has arisen.56
Draftsmanship is of the greatest importance,
because what is most distinctive about arbitration as a
modality of dispute resolution, is its most fundamental
premise—party autonomy.57 That is, in contrast to judicial
litigation, the parties choosing arbitration can control the
entire dispute resolution process, by way of how the
agreement to arbitrate is drafted.58 The parties can designate
the scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. They can designate
the available remedies, including a cap or high-low range on
the amount that can be awarded by the arbitrator.59 The
entire substance and process is subject to the parties’ consent
in establishing arbitration as the means for resolving their
dispute.60
They can determine the substantive and
procedural law that governs both the arbitration process and

56

Blackaby, supra note 54.
Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, The Role of Party Autonomy in International
Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 24, 25 (1997); ALAN REDFERN, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 135, 315 (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed.
2004); Gordon Blanke, International Arbitration in EC Merger Control: A
“Supranational” Lesson to be Learnt, EUR. COMPETITION L. REV., 324, 335–
36 (2006); Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration
as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 121, 140
(2006); INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, THE AUTONOMY OF THE PARTIES
IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS BETWEEN PRIVATE PERSONS OR ENTITIES
(Basel
Session
1991),
https://www.idiiil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1991_bal_02_en.pdf
(characterizing
party
autonomy of arbitration as one of ‘the fundamental principles of private
international law’).
58
Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25; REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke,
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140;
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57.
59
See FindLaw Attorney Writers, Another Look at Remedies in Arbitration,
FindLaw
(Last
Updated
Apr.
29,
2016),
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-disputes/another-look-at-remedies-inarbitration.html.
60
Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25; REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke,
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140;
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57.
57
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the merits of the dispute.61 This can include the utmost
significant detail, such as, burden and standard of proof, the
extent of disclosure, the nature and presentation of evidence,
time limits, and decisions on weight and admissibility of
evidence.62 The parties can choose that the substantive law
governing the merits of the dispute will be differently
sourced than the procedural law, or different from the
procedural law and substantive law that will govern the
arbitral process.63
There are many choices to be made by the
government lawyer in drafting the arbitration clause. Should
the arbitration be left ad hoc, to be agreed, if at all, once a
dispute arises, or agreed as part of the greater deal? Should
arbitration be mandated to occur under the aegis of an
arbitral institution and/or its rules? That is, to what extent is
it desirable to utilize an existing arbitral institution, which
may be expensive, or maintain more robust and complete
control over the procedural and substantive issues—though
going it ad hoc is going it alone and may require reinventing
the wheel and thereby heighten the risk of leaving out
something important? What should be the scope of the
arbitration as to jurisdiction, including substantive issues?
What should be the remedial authority of the arbitrator?
Should a time frame and/or time limits be specified? Should
the parties empower the arbitrator to interpret or clarify its

61

Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25; REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke,
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140;
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57.
62
Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25; REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke,
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140;
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57.
63
Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25; REDFERN, supra note 57, at 315; Blanke,
supra note 57, at 335–36; Van Harten & Loughlin, supra note 57, at 140;
INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 57.
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award?64 Should the arbitrator be authorized to resolve
future related disputes between the parties?65
Any one of these parameters may prove critical to
sustaining an arbitral award. If the tribunal exceeds the
granted authority, by going beyond the designated
jurisdiction and issues, any eventual award may be set aside
or refused recognition and enforcement, as by way of article
V(1)(a), (c) and (d) of the New York Convention governing
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and every wellestablished arbitral system, domestic or international.66 This
naturally follows from the principle of party autonomy,
whereby it is the limits established by the parties that control.
Each limit proposed in drafting the arbitration clause
warrants close analysis as to its potential consequences.
Potential abuse of process may be subtle and packaged as
innocent. This means, for arbitration involving government,
that any parameter concerning scope of arbitration must be
examined closely in reference to public policy and the
pertinent governmental objectives.
What is revealed in the case law, when there is
neglect as to the drafting of the arbitration clause, is highly
cautionary and instructive. It is remarkable how commonly
lawyers fail to consider potential consequences of provision
for arbitration that must be recognized from the very outset
of a contractual relationship. Even in the performance of
prestigious law firms and their highly compensated
64

See J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 100 (Cambridge
Univ. Press ed., 6th ed. 2017).
65
In Rainbow Warrior, the arbitration ruling focused on creating a framework
to regulate the parties’ future relationship and behavior. Rainbow Warrior was
a dispute between France and New Zealand that arose when an undercover
French military operation sank a Dutch ship berthed in the Auckland Harbor.
Rainbow Warrior Affair (N.Z. v. Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 215, 254 (Fr.–N.Z. Arb.
Trib. 1990). For further discussion, see MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 96–97,
107.
66
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
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attorneys, there is well-documented lack of awareness of the
significance of the content of the arbitration clause or
arbitration agreement—until it is too late.67
Consider one example of this sort of lawyer
negligence, where the lawyers left out just about everything,
but were nevertheless compelled to arbitrate. This was a
significant governmental arbitration that took place in San
Francisco, California, in the early 1980’s, concerning the
very substantial matter of debt obligations of the then newly
installed Sandinista government of Nicaragua.68 That
government sought to compel arbitration of its expropriation
of a fruit company, one of the U.S. enterprises that had
previously dominated the Nicaraguan economy.69 Meeting
in San Francisco, the lawyers on both sides of the dispute
thought they had achieved a settlement.70 But the deal was
never finalized, and contracts never executed.71 However,
the lawyers had vaguely agreed to arbitrate disputes.72
The agreement to arbitrate was wholly deficient,
with virtually nothing specified.73 The lawyers couldn’t
even remember the name of the London arbitration agency
some of them thought they might use, so they didn’t
designate an arbitral forum by name.74 Nevertheless, the
U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in San
Francisco, determined that arbitration was required, on the
basis of the strong United States federal policy in favor of
arbitration, and the related so-called “separability
doctrine.”75 That doctrine provides that though a contract
may be held to be invalid or never even consummated, if

67

New York Convention, supra note 66.
Republic of Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1991).
69
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
70
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
71
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
72
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
73
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
74
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
75
Nicaragua, 937 F.2d 469.
68
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arbitration was agreed, arbitration will be treated as
severable and enforceable.76
That same “separability doctrine” is accepted in
most national jurisdictions.77 Moreover under the widely
established principle of Kompetenz–Kompetenz, a doctrine
which many jurisdictions link as implied by the separability
doctrine, it is for the arbitral tribunal itself to determine any
question concerning validity of the arbitration clause or
arbitration agreement.78

76
GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 74–95
(Wolters Kluwer ed., 2d ed. 2001).
77
See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] May
7, 1973, Recueil Dalloz 1963, 545; Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal]
Feb. 24, 1994, 1997 XXII Y.B. Comm. Arb. 682l (“In international commercial
arbitration, the principle of the autonomy of the arbitration agreement is a
principle of general application, being an international substantive rule
consecrating the legality of the arbitration agreement, beyond all reference to a
system of conflict of laws.”); Corte di Appello [court of appeal] Bologna, 21
December 1991, n. 1786 (It.) (“the arbitral clause is autonomous with respect
to the contract – so that the nullity of the latter does not automatically affect the
former”); Cass. 2 July 1981, n. 4279 (It.) (arbitration clause is “not affected by
any nullity and, therefore bars the admissibility before the court, of an action
aimed at having a contract declared null and void because its subject matter is
unlawful”); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 27, 1970,
53 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ]
315 (Ger.); Preliminary Award of 14 January 1982, 1986 XI Y.B. Comm. Arb
97, 102 (“The Autonomy of an arbitration clause is a principle of international
law that has been consistently applied in decisions rendered in international
arbitrations, in the writings of the most qualified publicists on international
arbitration, in arbitration regulations adopted by international organizations and
in treaties”).
78
Final Award in ICC Case No. 5294 of 22 February 1988, 1989 XIV Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 137; Final Award in Case No. 3896 of 1982, 1985 X Y.B.
Comm.Arb. 47; Final Award in Case No. 5485 of 18 August 1987, XIV Y.B.
Comm. Arb. 156, 159 (1989) (“in international commercial arbitration the
arbitrators have the authority to determine their own jurisdiction”);
TOPCO/Calasiatic v. Libya, Nov. 27, 1975 Preliminary Award, reprinted in J.
Gillis Wetter, The International Arbitral Process: Public and Private, 74 AM.
J. INT’L. L. 441 (1979). See generally BORN, supra note 76; see also, J. Gillis
Wetter, The Importance of Having A Connection, 3 ARB. INT’L. 329 (1987);
Berthold Goldman, The Complementary Roles of Judges and Arbitrators in
Ensuring That International Commercial Arbitration is Effective, SIXTY YEARS
OF ICC ARBITRATION – A LOOK AT THE FUTURE 255, 263 (1984); STEPHEN
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In light of the general inclination of the courts to
defer to arbitration, it can be expected, particularly after an
arbitration has come to judgment, that the competent court
would be highly disinclined to nullify an arbitration
provision, except in the most egregious case of the arbitral
tribunal exceeding its evident jurisdiction, or having
succumbed to one of the otherwise stated limited grounds for
overturning an award, such as extortion or corruption.79
Moreover once an arbitration has reached judgment and
award, courts naturally are reluctant to nullify the arbitration
provision.80 In other words, once you agree to arbitration,
you are in all likelihood, stuck with it for the duration.
Negligence in drafting the clause, as in the example
just related, is all too common.81 When lawyers are
negotiating an agreement, they focus on the deal, not the
dispute resolution that might be engaged if the deal falls
apart, notwithstanding that good lawyering requires
evaluation of risk.82 Normally, so long as they are not
thinking about arbitration, there really isn’t all that much to
think about because the existing litigation system is a given.
Lawyers, including government lawyers, naturally are
inclined to assume the more familiar details and dynamics of
the dispute resolution process of court litigation. Because
the parties and their lawyers intent on making the deal, not
much may be thought or said about dispute resolution unless
someone puts arbitration on the table.83 Even with that,

SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE SALIENT PROBLEMS 1-60
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed, 1987).
79
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002).
80
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002).
81
John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins,
58–APR DISP. RESOL. J. 28 (February–April 2003).
82
Negotiate to win, AMERICAN BAR ASS’N: FIRST FOCUS (October 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2019/octob
er-2019/pros-offer-constructive-tips-for-negotiating-/.
83
Negotiate to win, supra note 82.
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arbitration is often treated as a minor matter, an option, or
often at best an afterthought.84
Because the critical principle of arbitration is “party
autonomy,” arbitration opens design of the dispute
resolution process to the parties creating their own legal
system.85 If the lawyer engaged in arbitration with the
government doesn’t do the preparatory work required to
secure his client’s interests in designing the arbitration, the
lawyer will have missed a boat that has already sailed. If the
boat later sinks with the client’s cargo, the lawyer is poorly
positioned to deny responsibility. The truth of the matter is
that when things go wrong, the arbitration clause, however
ill-formed, may likely become the most important clause in
the contract. So it is imperative that the lawyers, especially
government lawyers being charged with the public interest,
do the necessary preparation when thinking of engaging
arbitration; giving the most fulsome consideration to
drafting the arbitral regime by way of the arbitration clause
in all its critical aspects.
For the government, some aspects may be so critical
as to instruct against arbitration. By agreeing to arbitration,
the government lawyer risks waiving powers, defenses, or
rights that are unique to the government.86 These powers,
defenses, or rights must therefore be brought into focus
before agreeing to arbitration.
Most of all, it is essential for government lawyers to
appreciate that the contractual adoption of an arbitration
clause entirely preempts the issue of immunity. In U.S.
domestic law and in general in international arbitrations, an
84

Larry P. Shiffer, Remedies for Arbitration Clause Impossibilities, CASETEXT
(April 16, 2015), https://casetext.com/analysis/remedies-for-arbitration-clauseimpossiblities.
85
Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25.
86
Ryan Henry, Texas Supreme Court holds immunity waived for arbitration
clauses, but only a court can decide the immunity question, LAW OFFICES OF
RYAN HENRY, PLLC (May 8, 2020) https://rshlawfirm.com/texas-supremecourt-holds-immunity-waived-for-arbitration-clauses-but-only-a-court-candecide-the-immunity-question/.
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agreement to arbitrate is read broadly by courts as a waiver
of any possible claim of immunity.87 The pendulum has
swung so far in this direction that in 1988 the United States
Congress passed a statute that specifically provides that if a
government or government agency has agreed to arbitration,
the agreement to arbitrate completely eliminates sovereign
immunity from the dispute, whether as a defense or
otherwise.88 The instruction, therefore, for a lawyer
representing a government or government agency is: never
agree to arbitration without fully assessing your potential
claims for immunity or other special rights of government
that may be thereby waived.
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY
A.
PARTY AUTONOMY
Arbitration presents dire risks for governmental
interests. It is “party autonomy,” the foundational principle
of arbitration, that carries this risk.
A government lawyer especially should be aware of
the serious consequence of party autonomy in affecting the
mindset of the arbitrator. Arbitration is likely to be much
less sensitive to the concerns of the government than
litigation before a judge.89 This is because the social
legitimacy of arbitration is based exclusively on the parties’
consent, not national sovereignty.90 For an arbitrator, the
standard for decision-making is the contract.91 Judicial
litigation, to the contrary, while considering the contract,
makes primary the interests of the state and subordinate
87

See BORN, supra note 76.
For discussion of sovereign immunity in the realm of international arbitration,
see generally Tai-Heng Cheng & Ivo Entchev, State Incapacity and Sovereign
Immunity in International Arbitration, 26 SINGAPORE ACAD. L. J. 942 (2014).
89
See generally Gary L. Benton, Arbitrators Are Not Judges, SILICON VALLEY
ARBITRATION
&
MEDIATION
CENTER
(Jan.
4,
2018),
https://svamc.org/arbitrators-are-not-judges/.
90
Natalie Chaeva, Consent to Arbitration, JUS MUNDI (July 13, 2020)
https://jusmundi.com/en/document/wiki/en-consent-to-arbitration.
91
Hoffman, supra note 8.
88
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values of the legal system and rule of law, particularly when
the government is one of the parties.92 The arbitrator’s
preoccupation is: what did the parties intend their contract to
mean? The litigation judge, on the other hand, is not just
interpreting the contract, but is doing so guided by concerns
of public policy reflected in statutory or regulatory law and
the relevant corpus of adjudication, whether binding by stare
decisis or as respected authority.93 The judge, as a
government official, has the responsibility to secure the
mandates of the law and the integrity of the official legal
system.94 Yes, the judge looks to the intent of the parties,
but gives priority to the mandates of the law with awareness
that whatever he or she decides, that decision will fold into
precedent for the future of society.95 The arbitrator is not
bound by prior decisions, and normally is not concerned with
instructing non-parties or even present parties for the
future.96 The arbitrator’s focus is what is required for
resolution of the instant case consistent with the express
contractual intent of the parties.97 It is also true, however,
that where multiple interests are involved, including those of
non-parties, the arbitrator is better positioned to elicit those
interests and craft orders that take into account the full
collection of interests involved relative to the litigation judge
confined by the need to rule on motions or judgment by the

92

Hoffman, supra note 8.
Hoffman, supra note 8.
94
Code of Conduct for United States Judges, UNITED STATES COURTS (March
12, 2019) https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-unitedstates-judges.
95
The Importance of Precedent, JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S HANDBOOK,
http://jailhouselaw.org/the-importance-of-precedent/ (last visited March 3,
2021).
96
Paula Costa e Silva et al., Arbitral Precedent: Still Exploring the Path,
ARB.
BLOG
(Oct.
28,
2018)
KLUWER
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/10/28/arbitral-precedentstill-exploring-the-path/.
97
Hoffman, supra note 8.
93
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more purely adversarial structure of litigation.98 In this
regard, arbitration can allow for greater input by the parties
as to the workability of decision-maker results, particularly
the more technical questions of implementation that may be
involved.99
The litigation judge is also aware that any decision
he or she renders is subject to reversal if found at odds with
the letter or policies of the law. In judicial litigation, the
judge writes for other judges. The judge is concerned with
his or her institutional duty to the legal system, and perhaps
above all, the very personal and professional concern not to
be reversed.100 In that regard, judicial litigation has a more
conservative inclination in its results. The formality and
procedural requirements of judicial litigation in comparison
to arbitration also make it more likely that the litigation
judge will be restrained by established norms than will the
arbitrator, quite apart from the degree to which stare decisis
may be controlling.101
The arbitrator, in contrast to the litigation judge,
proceeds unencumbered by precedent, instructed by it, but
not concerned about making it or following it, and relatively
free to act contrary to established standards. The arbitrator
is accordingly freer to take on a quasi-legislative role and
shape the dispute to the interests of the parties at hand. The
arbitrator, though distinguished from mediator by the power
to dispose, can act as problem-solver vis-a-vis the parties.
98
See generally Eugene J. Heady, What Will the Arbitrator’s Final Award Look
CURRIE
(May
9,
2014),
Like?,
SMITH
https://www.smithcurrie.com/publications/common-sense-contract-law/whatwill-the-arbitrators-final-award-look-like/.
99
See generally, Heady, supra note 98.
100
Andrew Cohen, Influencing and Challenging Judges and Their Decisions in
Child Welfare Cases, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Sept. 11, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/child_law/resources/child
_law_practiceonline/january---december-2019/influencing-and-challengingjudges-and-their-decisions-in-child-/.
101
Annie Beersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court of
Arbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping
Disputes in Track and Field, 12 DISP. RESOL. L.J. 189, 190 (2012).
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The proactive litigation judge, especially in the common law
system, is inclined to act, when the situation warrants, as
policymaker within the law and for the most part, bound by
established legality. The arbitrator’s freedom to depart from
established standards, and proceed untroubled by future
policy, results because the arbitrator can act without fear of
review of the merits, given the very narrow and limited
grounds for reversal of an arbitral award, whether under U.S.
arbitration law or international arbitration standards.102
This also results in the relative freedom of the
arbitrator to ignore imperatives of public policy. Arbitral
rules include a public policy limitation on enforcement as
declared, for example, in the New York Convention
regarding enforcement of international arbitral awards and
stated in virtually all arbitration regimes.103 But are such
“public policy” limitations effective? The actual record of
arbitrations, both national and international, belies the
effectiveness of public policy as a policing concept. Public

102

See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002) (Exemplifying the narrow
grounds for review of an international arbitral award are the grounds stated in
the New York Convention on Recognition and enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards now adopted by most other nations significantly engaged in
international trade and investment, and which Brazil joined in 200); New York
Convention, supra note 66 (Five defenses are found in Article V(1) and two in
Article V(2). The five Article V(1) defenses are (1) incapacity and invalidity,
(2) lack of notice or fairness, (3) arbitrator acted in excess of authority, (4) the
tribunal or the procedure was not in accord with the parties’ agreement, and (5)
the award was not yet binding or had been set aside. The two Article V(2)
defenses are (1) lack of arbitrability and (2) violation of public policy. The
party resisting enforcement under any of the defenses has the burden of proof,
though the two defenses in Article V(2) can also be raised by the court sua
sponte. Most notable in relation to appeal is that none of the defenses are based
on the merits, and there is universal acknowledgment in national and
international litigation that the defenses are to be narrowly construed.); see
MARGARET L. MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 231–44 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 3d ed. 2017), for relevant
summary of results, particularly under the New York Convention defenses.
103
New York Convention, supra note 66.
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policy is rarely invoked with success to prevent the
rendering or enforcement of an arbitral award.104
The consequence, therefore, of the party-autonomy
principle of arbitration, as it plays out in arbitration and
judicial review of arbitral awards, is that even the most
significant public policy, even if embodied in the most
significant substantive laws, can be sacrificed to arbitration.
And to the present day, not only U.S. state and federal cases,
but international adjudication of arbitral awards, instruct that
public policy as a limitation on arbitration, is not much of a
limitation at all.105 One reason for this is simply that
burdened courts come to love arbitration as means to lighten
their caseload.
Accordingly, they tend to read the
arbitrator’s jurisdiction as broadly as possible, whatever
might be implied from statutory or decisional law.
Under the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA,
arbitration will prevail also as to the procedural aspects of
vindication of a federal or state right. Thus, though
enforcing a waiver of class arbitration leaves no economic
incentive for claimants to pursue their rights through

104
See, e.g., U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 34(3)(b)(ii),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/0786998_Ebook.pdf; China’s Civil Procedure Rules (allowing refusal of
enforcement of foreign award that runs counter to social and public interests of
the country). There are exceptional cases where public policy has been
determinative; see Özmak Makina Ve Elektrik Anayi AS v. Voest Apline
Industrieanlagenbau GmBH and anor, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme
Court] Sept. 18, 2001, 4P_143/2001, 20 ASA Bulletin 311 (Switz.); Francelino
da Silva Matuzalem v. Federation Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA), [BGer] Mar. 27, 2012, 4A_558/2001 (Switz.) (holding that restriction
of a person’s economic freedom violated public policy, because FIF banned the
payer from all football-related activity until full amount of obligation to the
organization was repaid).
105
For a list of court decisions from countries reversing previous law to permit
arbitration of contracts even where implicating antitrust issues, see REDFERN,
supra note 57, at 165–68.
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arbitration, the arbitration clause will be enforced as
written.106
Another reason the courts are inclined to read the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator as broadly as possible is—as
previously noted with respect to the admission of evidence—
that there is no deduction from the judge’s salary for the
lesser work resulting from deferring to arbitration. Because
the litigation judge is paid by the state at a fixed salary no
matter the lesser or greater his or her caseload, and the
arbitrator bills by the hour or by the day, litigation judge and
arbitrator working from the perspective of their own
professional and economic interests are alike content with
the broadest reading of arbitral jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the enhanced risk that public policy will be ignored.
The ostensible control by imposition of “public
policy” is even less consequential at the enforcement stage
of arbitration than when asserted as basis for “nonarbitrability.” Though most arbitration formulations provide
for public policy or “good morals” as basis for nonenforcement or annulment of an arbitral award, these
doctrines are rarely employed, and rarely successful.107 In
the critical and seminal case of Mitsubishi v. Soler,108 where
106
The Supreme Court addressed such argument directly in the Italian Colors
case, a case involving tension between the FAA and federal antitrust law,
declaring that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps
any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.” American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, n.5 (2013).
107
See, e.g., Laurie A. Tribble, Vacating Arbitrators’ Awards Under the Public
Policy Exception: Are Courts Second-Guessing Arbitrators’ Decisions, 38
VILL. L.R. 1051, 1055 (1993).
108
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985) [hereinafter Mitsubishi]. Mitsubishi was a joint venture by Chrysler
International, S.A. (“CISA”), a Swiss corporation, and Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Inc., a Japanese corporation. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
(“Soler”), the plaintiff, was a Puerto Rico corporation that sold automobiles,
with its principal place of business in Pueblo Viejo, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico.
Soler and CISA entered into a distributor agreement which provided for the sale
of Mitsubishi automobiles, by Soler, within Puerto Rico. Mitsubishi, CISA,
and Soler entered into a sales agreement which provided for the sale of
Mitsubishi products to Soler (for Soler to sell under the distributor agreement
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the issue was arbitration of a dispute under the U.S. antitrust
laws, the Supreme Court said the public policy mandate of
the antitrust laws could be guaranteed because at the time the
prevailing party would seek enforcement of the award, the
reviewing court could check whether the U.S. antitrust laws
had been taken into account by the arbitrator, and if not taken
into account, could deny enforcement.109 But because an
arbitral award is most often in the form of an amount of
currency to be paid or a denial of any compensation, this
terms). The sales agreement included an arbitration clause that provided for all
disputes under the agreement to be resolved by arbitration in Japan. The sales
agreement stated, “All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise .
. . shall be finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules
and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.” Mitsubishi
at 617.
Due to difficulties in the new car market, Soler sought to delay
shipment of Mitsubishi products and to sell the Mitsubishi automobiles outside
of Puerto Rico to meet its expected sales goals. Mitsubishi and CISA
disallowed shipment of the products by Soler outside of Puerto Rico and
ultimately withheld shipments before bringing legal action. Mitsubishi brought
an action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico to
compel arbitration of several disputes under the agreement.
Soler
counterclaimed and asserted causes of action under the Sherman Act, the United
States federal antitrust law. Soler alleged Mitsubishi and CISA violated the
Sherman Act because they conspired to restrain free trade by dividing markets.
Soler alleged Mitsubishi and CISA refused to sell ancillary products that would
enable Soler to sell the automobiles outside of Puerto Rico and that Mitsubishi
and CISA attempted to replace Soler with a wholly owned subsidiary as the
exclusive Mitsubishi retailer in Puerto Rico. Though Soler conceded that
disputes of contract interpretation are generally arbitrable, Soler contended that
the arbitration clause must specifically contemplate the arbitration of disputes
arising out of statutes that were designed to protect the party resisting
arbitration. Mitsubishi at 620.
109
The Supreme Court purported to afford protection for public policy in
stating, "[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, [U.S.] courts will
have the opportunity at the award enforcement stage to ensure that the
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.
The Convention reserves to each signatory country the right to refuse
enforcement of an award where the “recognition or enforcement of the award
would be contrary to the public policy of that country.” Article V(2)(b). While
the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award
enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually
decided them.” Mitsubishi at 638.
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claim of control is pure fiction. How would a reviewing
court determine whether a number or zero, the typical
antitrust results, represents the arbitration having taken into
account the antitrust laws?110
In the past, many U.S. courts were inclined to
reverse an arbitral award when there was so-called “manifest
disregard of the law,” as might be the case for substantive
law as important as the antitrust laws.111 “Manifest disregard
of the law” could, in theory, leave an opening for the
realization of public policy.112
However, “manifest
disregard of the law” is no longer generally recognized as a
valid objection to recognition and enforcement of an arbitral
award.113 Indeed, there are typically no formal limits to
prevent an arbitrator from making an error in choosing or
interpreting the governing substantive law except as
explicitly stipulated by the parties, and no limit in
interpreting the law or applying the law to the facts.114 The
arbitrator can even apply general principles of law that go
beyond the law which a judge may apply.115
For example, particularly in a commercial
arbitration involving international parties, an arbitrator may
recognize and apply general principles of international
commercial law, so-called “lex mercatoria,” the “new law
110
And of course, the arbitrator, now aware that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Mitsubishi decision could be a basis of reversal of his or her award if the
antitrust laws are ignored, to protect the award can simply state in the award
that the arbitration did take into account the antitrust laws. Mitsubishi at 638.
111
Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The ‘Manifest
Disregard of the Law’ Standard, 52, B.C. L. REV., 137, 137, (2011).
112
See Michael H. LeRoy, supra note 111, at 137.
113
Thus, in a case governing arbitration under federal law in the United States,
the Supreme Court resolved a division between federal circuit courts when it
held that judicial review of an arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act
is limited to the narrow grounds listed in the statute; see Hall St. Assocs. v.
Mattel Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008).
114
See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a
Code of Conduct for International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L., 341, 414–
15 (2002) (stating “(e)ven clear mistakes of law in arbitral awards are virtually
immune from appellate review.”).
115
See Rogers, supra note 114, at 415.
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merchant,” or “transnational law.”116 This may be to the
advantage of the government attorney when there is risk that
the matter at hand may be subject to the jurisdiction of a
foreign state and its adverse principles, even to the point
where the government attorney may wish to negotiate a
stipulation that such general principles rather than national
laws will be applied.
But it is also necessary for the government attorney
to keep in mind that any reference to such “general
principles,” given their generality, is inherently an invitation
to the expansion of the arbitral tribunal’s flexibility and
discretion in the exercise its power.117 This presents another
potential to undermine the public interests with which the
government is charged, and therefore cautions adoption of
general principles as absolving the agreement of risk.
Moreover, notwithstanding this risk of reference to illdefined general principles, judicial approval can generally be
expected to follow given the contemporary presumptive
validity of arbitration for its value in achieving expeditious
finality.118
There is a complex of reasons why judges are
inclined to leave it all to arbitration, despite what may be
their better instincts for protecting the public interest. This
inclination effectively opens the way for arbitrators to
maximize their exercise of power. Most importantly, the
grounds for review and reversal of an arbitral award are so
limited, and the inclination of judiciaries to avoid any review
on the merits so strong, that the ultimate result of party
autonomy and independence of the arbitrator is that the
116
For example, “[t]he Brazilian arbitration law allows the use of national rules,
non-national rules, general principles of law, uses and customs, and
international rules of commerce for resolving the dispute.” Savio R. Sordi,
Tatiana de Almeida F.R. Cardoso Squeff, The Introduction of Arbitration
Within the Brazilian Legal Context, 4 PANOR. BRAZ. LAW 306, 320, (2016).
117
Philip McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A “Second
Look” at International Commercial Arbitration, 93 NW. L. REV. 453, 471
(1999).
118
See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 587.
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arbitrator is seated at the head of the table as the proverbial
“500-pound gorilla.”119 The arbitrator is a 500-pound gorilla
because the arbitrator need not worry about reversal on the
basis of public policy, or any argument grounded in the
merits, so as long as there is no demonstrable bias, offense
to due process, or lack of jurisdiction—all rarely successful
grounds for reversal or nullification of an arbitral award.120
The instruction, therefore, for a lawyer representing
government or its agencies is that by choosing arbitration
over judicial litigation, that lawyer runs a significant risk that
public policy or “good morals” will fall outside the purview
of the arbitrator, who is focused primarily and most often
exclusively on what the parties intended by their contract.
There is thus good reason to be cautious about adopting
arbitration. If the dispute importantly concerns public policy
of the state rather than simply contractual rights, the
government lawyer must beware of the arbitrator. The
arbitrator is less likely than the judge to pay heed to the
remedial and deterrence functions of the law, and less likely
to seek to deter conduct that is inimical to the public good.121
Presumably, negotiating the requirement for a socalled “reasoned award” can serve to assure adherence to the
law and its public policy mandate.122 A potential antidote to
the uncontrolled discretion of the arbitrator is to require the

119

See Hall St. Assocs., 552 U.S. at 587.
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.6
(West, current through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
121
For example, in a labor dispute the arbitrator is less likely than the judge to
rule in a manner to put employees or employers outside the arbitration on notice
of correct behavior. The arbitrator is also less likely to act to prevent future
public law violations; see Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of
State Public-Policy-Based Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and
an Argument for Federal Agency Oversight, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L.R. 1 (2015).
122
See Types of Final Arbitration Awards: Why the Choice Matters, STRADLEY
RONON
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.stradley.com//media/files/publications/2020/02/adr-advisor--february-2020.pdf.
120
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arbitrator to include the arbitrator’s elucidation of its
reasoning with the award.123
No doubt the requirement for statement of reasons
does provide inhibition for the arbitrator.124 Knowing one’s
reasoning will be scrutinized surely encourages rational and
objective analysis, if for no other reason than the arbitrator’s
personal concern to maintain a reputation of integrity and
competence.125 No doubt the requirement of statement of
reasons is also a significant consideration in ensuring
objectivity.126 Even apart from the reputational concern for
integrity and competence of the arbitrator, this dynamic is
enhanced by the promise of more business for the arbitrator
perceived by prospective parties on both sides of a case as
fair, objective, and competent. In that the appointment of an
arbitrator depends on the consent of both sides, this is one
respect in which arbitration can be markedly superior to
adjudicative process, considering that judges in the formal
legal system who gain office by election or appointment are
less dependent on reputation for competence.
However, even the stipulation for a “reasoned
award” does not serve as an ultimate or absolute constraint
on the power of the arbitrator to ignore public policy.127 That
is because most, if not all, arbitral systems posit the
discretion of the arbitrator to act ex aequo et bono, i.e., to
exercise equitable discretion.128 This is not only for arbitral
systems involving government with the private sector or
operating under domestic law but also in international
arbitration that includes governments and their agencies.129
Particularly in international arbitrations involving
123

See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122.
See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122.
125
See infra Section E.
126
See Types of Final Arbitration Awards, supra note 122.
127
See Jaque I. Garvey, Arbitration Involving Governmental Entities, REVISTA
ELETRÔNICA DA PROCURADORIA GERAL DO ESTADO DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 14
(2018).
128
Garvey, supra note 127.
129
MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 158, 160–61.
124
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governments, ex aequo et bono is there, being valued as
assuring the flexibility of decision to frame a result as “fair”
for both parties.130 The arbitrator is not required to designate
winners and losers, as court litigation is ostensibly, if not
practically, designed to achieve. Such discretion of the
arbitrator is also valued as providing the flexibility to adjust
to changed circumstance and make provision to avoid future
conflict.131
If not rigidly referenced to certain legal standards
by consent of the parties, there is ultimately no guarantee to
insulate arbitration from the exercise of equitable discretion
to ignore public policy, whatever the rationalization offered
in the award.132 Ultimately, the limits on review are again
what is critical.133 Arbitrators universally render their
awards with full awareness that their awards cannot be
reviewed and reversed on the merits.134 It is the very nature
of arbitration to provide this assurance; the assurance of no
review on the merits being what distinguishes arbitration as
providing greater and more expeditious finality than judicial
litigation, or negotiation, or mediation.135
The tension between the arbitrator’s equitable
powers and the requirement of a reasoned award as a saving
grace for arbitration cannot be eliminated.136 Ex aequo et
bono is there, alive and well, and as a more threatening and
pervasive uncertainty than in litigation.137 The arbitrator’s
subjective sense of equity can determine the admission of
evidence, the cross-examination of witnesses, the
examination of documents, and most importantly, the
130

Garvey, supra note 127.
See, e.g., Rainbow Warrior Affair, 20 R.I.A.A. at 254.
132
See Judicial Exercise of Equitable Discretion in Enforcement of Arbitration
Contracts, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (1954).
133
See Garvey, supra note 127.
134
See Garvey, supra note 127.
135
Garvey, supra note 127.
136
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 460 (relating the goals for proper award
and values).
137
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 470.
131
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result.138 In arbitration, ex aequo et bono is not within the
discretion of a judge subject to judicial review, but simply
and finally, ‘equity’ is within the absolute discretion of a
500-pound gorilla.139
B.
POLITICAL DEFLECTION
In general, the more significant the public policy
interest involved in a dispute, the less likely a government
lawyer will be or should be inclined to agree to arbitration—
or, indeed, to any third-party neutral dispute resolution
process.140 One technique to still enjoy the benefits of
arbitration in matters of governmental significance, if it can
be accomplished, is to break up the dispute into its
components, resolving the lesser with arbitration and the
greater with negotiation or another mode of dispute
resolution.141 But the smartest strategy, in the right case of
high profile governmental interest, may be quite the
contrary—to adopt arbitration for resolution of the entire
dispute.142 This is a strategy that could be best described as
“political deflection.” The right dispute for this strategy is
when, as the colloquialism expresses it, “the dispute is too
hot for diplomacy to handle.”143
Consider two examples from international
arbitration: First, the arbitration between Israel and Egypt
concerning jurisdiction over the Taba area on the coast of the

138

McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 470.
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 460, 70.
140
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 486.
141
For example, in the Torres Strait dispute, a maritime delimitation between
Australia and Papua New Guinea, the arbitral tribunal approached the dispute
resolution process by splitting the issues and separating out items for
negotiation. For further discussion, see MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 160–61.
142
MERRILLS, supra note 64.
143
MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 160–61; Richard Bernstein, World Court Settles
Dispute on U.S.-Canada Boundary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1984),
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/13/world/world-court-settles-dispute-onus-canada-boundary.html,
139
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Sinai Peninsula,144 and second, the “Georges Bank” dispute
over fishing rights on the adjoining coasts of Canada and the
United States.145 Both were situations where the dispute was
so hotly loaded with the economic and political interests of
domestic constituencies that diplomacy was not likely to
succeed. For the case of Taba, given the history of the
conflict, the symbolic significance of any conflict of
jurisdiction between Israel and Egypt was potentially too
great for diplomatic resolution.146 For the Georges Bank
Arbitration, which concerned on the one side the Canadian
fishermens’ interests, and the other the United States
fishermens’ interests, a concession by either side would have
been viewed as a betrayal of its fishermen.147 In both Taba
and the Georges Bank, even if any diplomatic compromise
could be achieved, it inevitably would have left the
respective domestic constituencies blaming their
government for failure to adequately vindicate their rights.148
But by moving the matter to the neutral third party process
that arbitration affords, the governments of Israel, Egypt,
Canada, and the United States, in response to any result less
than 100%, could all proclaim to their domestic constituents,
“we did the best we could. It was the arbitrator who failed to
fully vindicate your rights.”149
It is thus that arbitration can be utilized as an escape
from political accountability—but surely not to be
condemned when the objective for all is successful dispute
resolution. For the government lawyer, the resolution of the
dispute to serve the relationships involved, whether between
144
MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100 (discussing the issues the international
tribunal was asked to decide and the lack of guidance of the tribunal).
145
Bernstein, supra note 143 (noting the dispute was decided by a five-judge
panel drawn entirely from Western democracies that based its decision largely
on technical and geographic grounds and rejected the U.S. and Canadian
historical ties arguments).
146
MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100.
147
Bernstein, supra note 143.
148
Bernstein, supra note 143; MERRILLS, supra note 64, at 100.
149
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at n.74.
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nations or other governmental entities, or the government
and a private party, on any of a variety of possible terms,
may be more important than the terms of the award.150 If the
political deflection that arbitration provides for the primary
benefit of all parties is what it takes, so be it.
V.

ARBITRATION AND CONFLICTING PUBLIC
POLICY
A.
FEDERAL PUBLIC POLICY
U.S. federal law does include ostensible constraints
on the use of arbitration where important federal public
policy is at issue.151 The FAA provides that Arbitration will
not be used whenever:
(1)
A definitive or authoritative
resolution of the matter is required for
precedential value, and such a proceeding
is not likely to be accepted generally as an
authoritative precedent;
(2)
The matter involves or may bear
upon
significant
questions
of
Governmental
policy
that
require
additional procedures before a final
resolution may be made, and such a
proceeding would not likely serve to
develop a recommended policy for the
agency;
(3)
Maintaining established policies is
of special importance, so that variations
among individual decisions are not
increased and such a proceeding would not
150

Spitko, supra note 121, at 40.
The U.S. Federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996 similarly
provides that arbitration should not be used when: (1) precedent is required; (2)
there are “significant questions of Government policy”; (3) “maintaining
established policies is of special importance” (4) “the matter significantly
affects persons or organizations who are not parties to the proceeding” (5) “a
full public record of the proceeding is important” and (6) “the agency must
maintain continuing jurisdiction over the matter[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
151
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likely reach consistent results among
individual decisions; . . . 152
Reflected in these standards is not only public
policy concern, but also concern about arbitration’s flouting
of stare decisis.153 One arbitral result may be predictive or
instructive as to another, but any given arbitration cannot, by
force of decision, create a body of public contract law that
other arbitration panels will necessarily follow, or even
purport to follow, or see as even bound to distinguish.154
Accordingly, if it is in the client’s interest to rely on
precedent, that is reason to prefer litigation to arbitration.155
This also means that in pre-arbitration, if arbitration is to be
the mode of dispute resolution, the parties are less able to
evaluate their chances of success than in judicial
litigation.156 The prospects of settlement are consequently
less as the parties are less able to evaluate, pre-arbitration,
their chances for success and achieve a predictable basis for
compromise.157
The U.S. Congress, of course, has the power to
exempt claims arising under any statute from the FAA’s proarbitration policy.158 But Congress has rarely shown any
such inclination, and the United States Supreme Court has
been adverse to finding any such mandate.159
This was dramatically demonstrated at the federal
level with respect to the United States antitrust laws—laws
that the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to as the nation’s
“Charter of Economic Liberty.”160 Given the importance
and grounding of the antitrust laws as fundamental economic
152

5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
154
See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
155
See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
156
See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
157
See 5 U.S.C. § 572 (1990).
158
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, n. 5 (2013).
159
Spitko, supra note 121, at 3, n. 1.
160
New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 436 U.S. 954 (1978);
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
153
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doctrine for the United States prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court addressing the matter of arbitration of the antitrust
laws, most commentators thought implementation of the
antitrust laws to be off-limits for domestic arbitration.161
This is especially true for international arbitration, which
would risk removing public policy control completely from
the jurisdiction of the United States.162
But after
international arbitration was deemed to be legitimately
advantageous in a broad range of U.S. federal statutory
areas, including the securities laws163 and labor laws,164 there
came the big test the arbitration community was waiting
for—arbitration of antitrust—where U.S. policy was
uniquely firm and extreme compared with most other
nations.
The case that ultimately tested arbitration against
the concern that it could undermine antitrust policy was the
case filed against the Mitsubishi Automobile Corporation, a
Japanese corporation with its principal place of business in
Tokyo, Japan, concerning its franchise operation in Puerto
Rico.165 The plaintiff distributor sought protection under the
U.S. antitrust laws.166
The prevalent view before the Mitsubishi decision was
rendered—on whether the antitrust laws could be trusted to
161

See Thomas Bush, Arbitration in Antitrust Cases, FREEBORN AND PETERS
LLP,
https://www.freeborn.com/sites/default/files/arbitration_in_antitrust_cases__freeborn.pdf
162
McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 485.
163
Diana B. Henriques, When Naivete Meets Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
1989), https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/03/business/when-naivete-meetswall-street.html (explaining the use of arbitration in securities disputes and the
relative leverage held by investors and brokers as a result).
164
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
TIMES
(Oct.
31,
2015),
Justice,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitrationeverywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (discussing the use of arbitration
clauses in employment contracts and the long-run impact on employees).
165
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985).
166
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
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arbitration—was that because the antitrust laws are designed
to promote and protect competition, and the United Sates has
a fundamental interest in enforcing its antitrust laws to
maintain a competitive position in the world market,
arbitration would not be allowed.167 Moreover, the thinking
was that because arbitration is based on the autonomy of
private parties to design and control both process and
substance, it is vulnerable to the inordinate leverage the
antitrust laws are purposed to prohibit, and therefore
arbitration would not serve adequately to provide deterrence
of potential antitrust violations.
The United States Supreme Court, addressing these
concerns, nevertheless declared the provision for foreign
arbitration in Japan valid and enforceable, much to the
surprise of the international arbitration community.168 It
disposed of two principal contentions that the antitrust
dispute was nonarbitrable.169 First, the court considered
whether the scope of the U.S. federal Arbitration Act
imposes a presumption of nonarbitrability of claims arising
under statutes that are not specifically mentioned in the
parties’ agreement.170 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court
considered whether the public interest in enforcing U.S.
antitrust laws was so paramount as to render antitrust
disputes nonarbitrable.171
Interpreting the scope of the FAA broadly, the Court
held that the Act does not imply a general presumption
against arbitration of statutory claims; quite the opposite. It
declared that the Court has a duty to “rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate” because Congress’s primary intent
in enacting the FAA was to enforce private parties’
167
Richard Levin, On Arbitration of Competition/Antitrust Disputes: A Tribute
RESOL.
J.
4,
39
(2019),
to
Mitsubishi,
73
DISP.
https://richardlevinarbitration.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/OnArbitration-of-Competition-Antitrust-Disputes-June-19.pdf.
168
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
169
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628, 640.
170
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
171
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
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agreements to arbitrate, and that doubts concerning whether
issues are arbitrable are to be resolved in favor of
arbitration.172 The Court allowed only that a clear
congressional statement of intent could be the basis to
determine that issues under federal law are non-arbitrable,
given the FAA and its categorical pro-arbitration mandate. It
concluded the United States Congress had not evidenced any
such intent, anywhere, to limit the broad scope of arbitration
in relation to the application of the U.S. anti-trust laws.173
In this respect the decision was somewhat myopic, given
the longevity of the antitrust laws, and their origination long
before arbitration was legislated as national policy in the
FAA.174 But the analysis and the result in Mitsubishi does
demonstrate how far the Court was willing to go to support
arbitration despite the countervailing public interests
embodied in statutory embodiment of federal public policy
in the antitrust laws or any other federal statute.175
172

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627–28.
174
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C §10 (2002).
175
In considering whether the significant public interest in enforcing U.S.
antitrust laws renders such disputes categorically unsuitable for arbitration, the
Court further concluded that international trade interests took precedence over
the public policy interests in enforcing U.S. antitrust law. Thus, it concluded,
there was no need to consider the categorical arbitrability of antitrust, declaring,
“[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and
transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international
commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that
we enforce the parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context.” Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. The Court
cited two earlier cases that involved the securities regulation statutes, also
constituting a body of law embodying significant public policy interest. (The
Court compared Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) and Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).) The earlier case, Wilko had concerned
securities regulation in a domestic context, and the Supreme Court held the
alleged securities law violations non-arbitrable. The latter case Scherk,
involving an international securities regulation dispute, was held to be
arbitrable. The Court reasoned similarly for its determination in Mitsubishi that
predictability of dispute resolution from contractual forum selection clauses is
imperative for international business dealings. In so doing it reflected the
similar view based in economics of international trade that the U.S. antitrust
laws are “designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy.”
173
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B.

STATE PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
FEDERAL/STATE CONFLICT
After passage of the FAA in 1996, there developed
a substantial jurisprudence of conflict between state and
federal law.176 On the one hand, there was state legislation
and adjudication overriding arbitration clauses deemed
inimical to state public policy.177 On the other was the proarbitration policy of the FAA as applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States to override state public policy.178
Unlike the analysis of conflict between the policy of
the FAA and other federal statutes where the issue is their
relative scope, when the issue amounts to conflict between
state public policy and the FAA, the issue was, and is, federal
preemption—whether state policy is trumped by the proarbitration mandate of the FAA.179 This conflict with state
law has become particularly acute as the expansion of
arbitration has expanded the efforts of companies to employ
arbitration clauses in their contracts to target costly or
embarrassing challenges to their power.180

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635. It acknowledged that private causes of action,
particularly through the treble damages remedy, play an important role in
enforcing antitrust, but reasoned that the choice to arbitrate disputes does not
forgo substantive rights afforded by statutes, but only trades the procedural
opportunities for review of a court opinion for the expediency of arbitration,
and that so long as private parties effectuated their intent to be that the arbitral
body would decide claims arising under the U.S. antitrust laws, the tribunal
should be bound to decide the claims in accordance with those laws. Therefore,
the Court reasoned, arbitration serves both remedial and deterrent functions. It
concluded that a minimally intrusive review of the arbitration decision should
be sufficient to ascertain the tribunal acknowledged and decided on the antitrust
claims. Id. at 638.
176
Robert Hollis et al., Is State Law Looking for Trouble: The Federal
Arbitration Act Flexes Its Preemptive Muscle, 2003:2 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2003),
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/217049943.pdf.
177
Hollis, supra note 176.
178
Hollis, supra note 176.
179
Hollis, supra note 176.
180
Abigail Abrams, 81 of the Largest U.S. Companies Won’t Let You Take
(Feb.
27,
2019
9:00AM)
Them
to
Court,
TIME,
https://time.com/5538028/consumer-arbitration-agreements/.
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The conflict extends to all sectors of the economy,
most especially to areas such as consumer rights, rights of
labor, and environmental concerns, often highlighting gross
disparities of economic power between commercial entities
and their workers or clients.181 Arbitration has become a
flashpoint of high-profile social conflict.182 Examples
include the use of arbitration clauses to stifle consumer
litigation rights, including waivers of the right to join in a
class action or the use of arbitration clauses and related
assurances of confidentiality such as non-disclosure
agreements to insulate employers against claims of sexual
harassment in the workplace.183
The clash between the FAA and state public policy
is probably most evident in the repeated clash between the
U.S. Supreme Court interpreting the FAA as broadly
preemptive, and the California legislature and California
courts trying to articulate exceptions in the interest of
California’s public policies.184 Indeed, the principal FAA
181

Abrams, supra note 180.
Abrams, supra note 180.
183
Abrams, supra note 180.
184
See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005)
(holding that class action waivers should not be enforced under a multi-factor
test and effectively ignoring the Supreme Court’s holding in Concepcion that
the FAA preempted California’s Discover Bank rule and required absolutely
that contractual waiver of class actions could not be regulated by California);
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 599 (Cal. 2007) (holding that “class
arbitration waivers should not be enforced if, the trial court determines, based
on certain factors . . . that class arbitration would be a significantly more
effective way of vindicating the rights of affected employees than individual
arbitration.”). These rulings were despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s
determination in Concepcion that the FAA prohibits states from conditioning
the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide
arbitration procedures. AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740,
1744 (2011); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy,
Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion, and the Future of American
Arbitration, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 323 (2011); Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) (holding claims for public
injunctive relief under the California Consumer Legal Remedies Act not subject
to arbitration); Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003)
(extending Broughton to include claims to enjoin unfair competition under
182
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preemption cases have concerned challenges under the FAA
to California statutory or case law.185 Unlike cases of
apparent conflict between the FAA and other federal
statutes, where a federal statute might be deemed sufficiently
clear and conclusive as prohibiting arbitration,186 where the
conflict is between the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy and
state law, the United States Supreme Court has uniformly
ruled in favor of FAA preemption of state public policy,
under the FAA187 and the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.188 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011
California’s Unfair Competition Law and claims to enjoin false advertising
under California Business and Professions Code Section 17500); Stephen A.
Broome, An Unconsciounable Application of the Unconsciounability Doctrine:
How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Federal Arbitration Act, 3
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39 (2006).
185
See Discover Bank, 113 P.2d at 1110; Gentry, 165 P.3d at 599; Concepcion,
131 S.Ct. at 1744; Broughton, 988 P.2d at 67; Cruz, 66 P.3d at 1157.
186
Spitko, supra note 121 at, at 8–9; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637–638.
187
The key provision of the FAA on which preemption is based is Section 2,
declaring as its foundational principle that, “A written provision in . . . a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C §2 (1947).
188
See AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011)
(holding that the FAA preempts California's judicially-created “Discover
Bank” rule classifying as unconscionable most consumer contract collectivearbitration waivers); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (holding that
the FAA preempts the section of the California Talent Agencies Act vesting in
the California Labor Commissioner exclusive original jurisdiction over claims
arising under the act); Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 470, 479 (1989) (holding that the FAA does not preempt a provision of the
California Arbitration Act allowing a court to stay arbitration pending
resolution of related litigation if the parties have agreed that the provision shall
govern their arbitration); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491–92 (1987)
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Labor Code
providing that an action to collect wages may proceed notwithstanding an
agreement to arbitrate); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
(holding that the FAA preempts the section of the California Franchise
Investment Law requiring judicial consideration of claims brought under the
California statute).
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decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and the
Court’s 2013 decision in American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant are characteristic as consistently in favor
of arbitration.189 These cases make clear that neither state
substantive policies nor procedural requirements of state law
are allowed to impair “the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”190 The California Supreme
Court, for example, attempted to carve out an exception from
preemption where enforcement of a private right is designed
as a substitute for action brought by the government, as
under California’s “Labor Code Private Attorneys General
Act of 2004.”191 The suit was in the nature of a private
attorney general action in that it was by an employee, but
also on behalf other current or former employees.192 The
United States Supreme Court categorically rejected such
exception.193
Notwithstanding the chain of rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court supporting federal preemption, the effort to
break the chain in favor of state public policy has continued
unabated, most notably by the legislature of California and
California courts.194 In 2020, a U.S. district judge enjoined
California officials from enforcing a new law that was to bar
employers from requiring workers, as condition of their
employment, to waive “any right, forum or procedure” for

189
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013);
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
190
Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1748.
191
CAL. LAB. CODE §§2698–2699.5 (West 2004).
192
Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, L.L.C., 327 P.3d 129 (Cal. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1155 (2015); Arias v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 923, 932
(Cal. 2009); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012). For critique of the California
Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian and other cases standing for the exception,
see Spitko, supra note 121, at 35–43.
193
Iskanian, 327 P. 3d; Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d.
194
Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d 1078, 1108 (E.D.
Cal. 2020).
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resolving employment disputes.195 The law would have
imposed civil and misdemeanor criminal penalties on
employers who required workers to agree to procedural
limitations on their ability to enforce employment rights.196
The California legislation explicitly provided that it was not
intended to invalidate arbitration agreements that are
otherwise enforceable under the FAA.197 Nevertheless, a
federal court found that California Assembly Bill 51 is
preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because it
“singles out arbitration by placing uncommon barriers on
employers who require contractual waivers of dispute
resolution options that bear the defining features of
arbitration.”198 Assembly Bill 51 was deemed to be invalid
for placing arbitration agreements on “unequal footing” as
compared to other contracts.199
The pertinent academic literature includes various
proposals for the realization of state public policy to avoid
the broadly preemptive interpretation of the FAA that is now
enshrined in a variety of opinions by the U.S. Supreme
Court.200 Since preemption is now the rule if at issue is a
state public policy inconsistent with broad interpretation of
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, the proposals
generally depend upon the finding of congressional intent to
preclude arbitration for certain types of disputes; effectively

195

Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108.
Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108.
See Spitko, supra note 121.
198
Spitko, supra note 121.
199
Becerra, 438 F. Supp. 3d at 1108; see Anthony J. Oncidi et al., Federal Court
Strikes Down California’s “Request Arbitration, Go to Jail” Law, THE
NATIONAL
LAW
REVIEW
(Feb.
12,
2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/federal-court-strikes-down-california-srequest-arbitration-go-to-jail-law.
200
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1753
(2011); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008): Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v.
Leland Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 470, 479 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482
U.S. 483, 491–92 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984);
Spitko, supra note 121.
196
197
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amending the FAA by constricting its application.201 We
have one example of this approach being realized, as the
federal McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that state
law preempts federal law with respect to the business of
insurance.202 Another is the 2010 Dodd Frank Act in which
Congress authorized the Securities and Exchange
Commission and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to
regulate the use of arbitration in broker–dealer and consumer
financial contracts.203
However, despite the many attempts to reverse
federal preemption in areas of preeminent state public policy
concern, such as labor and consumer rights, the record is one
of failure of the necessary Congressional consensus.204
There is no reason to expect this political reality to change
in the forseeable future given the powerful economic
interests that have managed to use arbitration clauses and
federal preemption under the FAA to negate procedural
rights, such as the class action, or substantive rights
201

See generally supra note 200.
An example is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provides that state law
preempts federal law with respect to insurance, stating “[n]o Act of Congress
shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any
state for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance . . . unless such Act
specifically relates to the business of insurance.” 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1947).
203
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 921 (2010) (authorizing Securities Exchange
Commission to regulate broker-dealers’ use of arbitration in customer
agreements); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 922 (2010) (prohibiting arbitration of
certain whistleblower claims); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1028 (2010)
(authorizing Consumer Financial Protection Bureaus to regulate consumer
financial companies’ use of arbitration); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1057(d)
(2010) (prohibiting arbitration of certain whistleblower claims created by
Dodd-Frank); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1414 (2010) (prohibiting use of
arbitration clauses in residential mortgage contracts).
204
See references to a multitude of unsuccessful bills to have Congress
invalidate predispute arbitration agreements, collected in Spitko, supra note
121, at 50–51, nn. 223–24.
202
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grounded in state policies of labor, consumer, or
environmental regulation.205
In the ongoing campaign to limit the impact of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s broadly pre-emptive reading of the
FAA, there has been the proposal of some sort of federal
deus ex machina to decide when state public policy should
not be preempted by the FAA.206 For example, one proposed
solution is creation of a federal overseer with expertise in
labor law with the power to strike a balance between state
employment regulation and enforcement of arbitration
agreements under the FAA.207 The model drawn on to
support this proposal is securities arbitration under the aegis
of “FINRA,” which today administers most arbitrations of
securities disputes.208
Surely though, any suggestion of a federal
bureaucratic means to reconcile conflict between the FAA
and state public policy is fundamentally misconceived.
There is a constitutionally profound difference between a
federal agency that employs arbitration to resolve conflicts
under a given state or federal law, as does FINRA, and an
agency, as proposed, that would have the power to resolve a
conflict between state public policy and the FAA. The
former is conflict resolution under a particular law.209 The
proposed bureaucratic solution would be the transfer to a
federal bureaucracy of the power to resolve a conflict
between federal and state law, a power constitutionally
relegated in its ultimate resolution under the United States
Constitution, never to any bureaucracy, but to the federal

205

See generally Spitko, supra note 121, at 50–51, nn. 223–24.
See generally Note, State Courts and the Federalization of Arbitration Law,
134, HARV. L. REV. 1184, (2021).
207
See Spitko, supra note 121, at 54.
208
Spitko, supra note 121, at 54–55; see also Constantine N. Katsoris,
Securities Arbitrators Do Not Grow on Trees, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
49, 62, 64 (2008).
209
See generally About FINRA, FINRA.ORG, https://www.finra.org/about.
206

329

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

49

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]

Arbitration With Government
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

courts, and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court.210 The U.S.
Supreme Court, having already determined that the FAA and
its pro-arbitration policy prevails in all cases where the
efficiency value of arbitration may be put at risk by state law,
any proposal for a federal bureaucracy to resolve conflict
between state policy and the FAA, in any case, is a nonstarter.211
Congress surely has the power to amend the
FAA.212 Congress no doubt could resolve the conflict in any
area of state concern by providing that state policies, whether
on employment, consumer rights, or environmental
concerns, or in any area within its power to legislate, should
prevail. But without Congress itself expressly providing for
particular state policy to trump the pro-arbitration policy of
the FAA, Congress does not have the power to compromise
the exclusive authority of the federal courts to resolve public
policy conflict when the question is one of federal
preemption.213
i. ARBITRATION WITH GOVERNMENT
AND COLLABORATIVE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
It is possible to minimize public policy concern yet
utilize arbitral process by designing arbitration as
conjunctive with collaborative process. We see this
alternative particularly in the arena of governmental
interagency arbitration, though it can be utilized in any arena
210

See, e.g., JAY B. SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825,
FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A LEGAL PRIMER (July 23, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45825.pdf.
211
See Lea Haber Kuck et al., The Supreme Court and Evolving Arbitration
(September
26,
2019),
Jurisprudence,
SKADDEN,
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2019/09/quarterlyinsights/the-supreme-court-and-evolving-.
212
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
213
See generally James C. Sturdevant, Federal Preemption Cases: Reflections
On The U.S. Supreme Court’s Busy Docket, PLAINTIFFMAGAZINE, (Feb. 2008),
https://www.plaintiffmagazine.com/recent-issues/item/federal-preemptioncases-reflections-on-the-u-s-supreme-court-s-busy-docket.
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of arbitration with government.214 If there is reason to adopt
a more collaborative process in conjunction with arbitration
to realize public policy despite the preemptive impact of the
FAA, how might that be done?
Arbitration employed for dispute resolution
between governments or governmental entities provides the
best demonstration of possible collaborative process,
because it typically involves contending public policies or
governmental interests contending for recognition, as well as
ongoing intergovernmental relationships which the
contending parties wish to nonetheless preserve.215 For
governmental interagency arbitration, or arbitration between
governments, the fusion with more collaborative processes
akin to mediation and negotiation can be especially
opportunistic.
In commercial arbitration, usually mediation and
negotiation, as available modes of dispute resolution, are
kept separate and distinct from arbitration—and for good
reasons.216 The most significant reason is that negotiation
for dispute resolution is facilitated when the parties do not
risk that positions stated and information disclosed in
mediation or negotiation as collaborative process will
undermine their positions in arbitration as an adversarial
process.217 Accordingly, most court systems and provisions
for mediation or negotiation provide for non-binding
mediation and/or negotiation to precede arbitration, and
include, as appropriate, assurances against disclosure.218

214
See generally Sarah B. Belter, The Use of Arbitration By Federal Agencies
To Solve Environmental Disputes: All Wrapped Up In Red Tape, 56, U. MIAMI
L. REV., 1033, (2002).
215
See generally Daniel T. Deacon, Agencies and Arbitration, 117, COLUM. L.
REV., 992, (2017).
216
See generally Mediation of Legal Disputes-The Basic Law, STIMMEL,
STIMMEL & ROESER, https://www.stimmel-law.com/en/articles/mediationlegal-disputes-basic-law.
217
STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER, supra note 216.
218
STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER, supra note 216.
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To the contrary, there is an outstanding model for
the fusion of arbitration and collaborative process when
governmental interest is involved.219 This is the formulation
that became the “Side Agreements on Labor and the
Environment” for the NAFTA trade agreement of the United
States, Canada and Mexico.220
The appeal of that
formulation was well demonstrated by the fact that it became
key to securing the NAFTA Treaty approval by the three
governments, despite resistance from their respective
domestic labor and environmental constituencies.221
The essentials of that design can be stated briefly,
though their elaboration warrants study for any replication
of what was achieved.222 The scheme is to begin dispute
resolution with negotiations at the highest governmental
level available, then to proceed to arbitration if those
negotiations do not resolve the dispute.223 However, the
design is exceptional in that the arbitrators’ work is not to
directly provide an award, but instead, to propose a mutually
satisfactory action plan.224 If the complained against party
rejects that plan, that party then has the burden of proposing
its own solution which the arbitrators can accept or reject.225
If the arbitrators reject the complained-against party’s
proposed solution, the complained-against party’s failure to
comply with the arbitrator-mandated plan through the end of
the process can result in sanction, first by fine, and if that
doesn’t secure the arbitrator plan, ultimately a loss of trade
219
See generally NAFTA and the Side Agreements: Risks in Turning NAFTA
Into a Labor/Environmental Pact, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, (May 13,
1993), https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/nafta-and-the-side-agreementsrisks-turning-nafta-laborenvironmental-pact.
220
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 219.
221
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 219.
222
Jack I. Garvey, Trade Law and Quality of Life-Dispute Resolution Under
the NAFTA Side Accords on Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT’L. L.
439 (1995).
223
See Garvey, supra note 222.
224
See Garvey, supra note 222.
225
See Garvey, supra note 222.

332

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol21/iss2/1

52

Garvey: Arbitration With Government
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]

Arbitration With Government
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

benefits.226
This design incorporates a number of
opportunities to negotiate along the course of this process
(which as originally formulated) is supposed to take a
maximum total of 1,225 days.227
The model’s uniqueness and advantage is to achieve
a fusion of political and legal process, maximizing the
expression and accommodation of the public policy interests
of the parties, while providing continuing opportunity for
consensual resolution.228 Arbitration is employed more to
drive the process of resolution than to provide an award—
more to educate the parties concerning constructive
resolution and enforce that outcome only if they cannot
reach resolution.229 The objective is to avoid the need to
employ the ultimate sanction of loss of trade benefits, a
result that would be counterproductive to the parties’ shared
purpose to further free trade.230 This is a design that
acknowledges the political reality that it is the parties who
best understand the respective interests they represent.231
But it employs arbitration and potential sanction to compel
the parties to find a practical solution.232 It is a design that
maximizes the capacity of arbitration, in contrast to
litigation, to achieve a solution instead of a winner.233
Presumably, that is the most desirable endgame for
intergovernmental arbitration, for interagency governmental
disputes at the state or federal level, between state and
federal governmental agencies, or as it could be employed
for disputes between government and private parties.

226

See Garvey, supra note 222.
Garvey, supra note 222, at 444.
228
See Garvey, supra note 222.
229
Garvey, supra note 222, at 439.
230
See Garvey, supra note 222.
231
See Garvey, supra note 222.
232
See Garvey, supra note 222.
233
See Garvey, supra note 222.
227
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ii.

THE POWER OF THE ARBITRATOR
TO SECURE PUBLIC POLICY

Might it be sufficient, where the clash is more
strictly and blatantly between the absolutist pro-arbitration
policy of the FAA as interpreted and state policy disallowing
collaborative resolution, to rely on the arbitrator’s neutrality
and expertise to advance the governmental public policy
objectives involved in a dispute? In other words, might the
arbitrator’s power afford the saving grace for the realization
of state public policy (though preemption in favor of the
FAA is the prevailing rule where there is a clash)?
Commands to assure the arbitrator’s neutrality are
replete in arbitral rules.234 And as the conventional wisdom
goes, one of the principal advantages of arbitration is to
secure the neutral and objective expertise of a decision
maker familiar with the policies pertinent to the nature of the
dispute.235 Moreover, most arbitral rules recognize, unless
otherwise stated in the arbitration agreement, that the
arbitrator is empowered to provide equity between the
parties.236
This is no reassurance, of course, with respect to
restoration of critical procedural matters, such as class
actions or punitive damages, which the U.S. Supreme Court
found to be specifically at odds with the FAA’s proarbitration policy.237 But recognizing that arbitration
includes significant discretion for the arbitrator, well beyond
that of the litigation judge, to inject public policy into the
arbitrator’s
deliberations—does
arbitration
assure
234

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1990).
See Spitko, supra note 121, at 54.
236
Broome, supra note 184.
237
See, e.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005);
Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 569 (Cal. 2007); AT&T Mobility
L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011); Stipanowich, supra note 184;
Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of Cal., 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999); Cruz v.
PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc., 66 P.3d 1157 (Cal. 2003); Broome, supra note
184; Spitko, supra note 121.
235
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neutrality? Moreover, if the arbitrator has the power to
provide equity, isn’t “fairness” including all relevant public
policy, the worthy objective? Shouldn’t the attorney
arbitrating with government want fairness even if emanating
from the arbitrator’s amorphous equitable power?
However, it is necessary to consider relatedly the
common criticism of the arbitral process—that it is “too
neutral.”238 The charge is commonly made, especially
among the practicing bar, that arbitrators tend to render
“compromise awards,” perhaps as a result of the contextual
nature of the arbitral process—the decision maker and the
parties’ attorneys in much closer and less formal interaction
than in judicial litigation—often of previous professional
acquaintance.239 More frequently than in judicial litigation,
the lawyers and the “neutral” deciding their case share
specific expertise, values, and relationships.240 Arbitrators
are chosen for their particular expertise, and they and the
lawyers who appear before them typically belong to the
same professional communities—certainly more than when
the lawyers appear before a judge of general jurisdiction
drawn from the formal legal system.241 The arbitrators may
indeed have an investment in not seriously displeasing
particular colleagues.242 Incentive to render a compromise
award and thereby not disenchant the lawyers involved may
also be in the arbitrator’s interest to maintain future business
in arbitral systems, such as those in the United States, that
provide that the parties choose the arbitrators, if only from
established lists, such as those employed by the American
Arbitration Association.243 For these reasons, there is the
238

McConnaughay, supra note 117, at 465.
See Garvey, supra note 222.
240
Jennifer C. Bailey, The Search to Clarify an Elusive Standard: What
Relationships Between Arbitratir and Party Demonstrate Evident Partiality?,
2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 153, 153 (2000).
241
Bailey, supra note 240.
242
Bailey, supra note 240.
243
Bailey, supra note 240.
239
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view that arbitrators are less inclined to issue an award that
manifests a clear winner or loser. 244
The common speculation that arbitration leads to
compromise awards, in contradistinction to the winner and
loser dynamic that drives court litigation, is belied to some
degree by the common ambivalence and ambiguity as to who
lost and who won often found as well in the result obtained
from the litigation judge.245 Moreover, the speculation that
arbitrators are less inclined to follow the law, and therefore
more inclined to render compromise awards, can at least be
said to be unsubstantiated given the empirical studies
specifically designed to expose the phenomenon of arbitral
compromise verdicts.246 Generally, these studies concluded
that arbitrators do not commonly engage in “splitting the
baby,” and that arbitral awards do result in clear winners and
losers no less than in the formal litigation system.247
But the widespread though unsubstantiated belief
that an arbitrator is more likely than a litigation judge to split
the baby merits special caution for the government lawyer.
The risk of a compromise result from a decision maker not
constrained by rights of appeal should be of special concern
when the government lawyer is dealing with a matter of
significant social policy and impact that warrants a clear
result for deterrence or other purposes relating to other
cases.248 The caution is to avoid arbitration for such matters,
or, if there is good reason nevertheless to secure the
advantages of arbitration, to carefully examine the reputation
244

See Garvey, supra note 222.
See Garvey, supra note 222.
246
Christopher R. Drahozal, Empirical Findings on International Arbitration:
An Overview, OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTL. ARBITRATION 1, 25 (Dec. 21,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888552.
247
See Stephanie Keer & Richard Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the
Baby”: Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitration: Collected
Empirical Research (2001), reprinted in Towards A Science Of International
Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research 311 (Drahozal & Naimark eds.,
2005).
248
See Garvey, supra note 222.
245
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of a particular arbitrator for objective disposition before
agreeing to his or her appointment.249
With respect to “fairness” in arbitration, we should
also recognize that party autonomy means that if there is
inordinate leverage between the parties that results in the
choice of arbitration, it can naturally lead to unfairness as to
any procedural or substantive aspect of arbitration.250 For
example, the health care contracts of the Kaiser System in
California formerly provided that only Kaiser doctors could
act as arbitrators.251 Besides the obvious problem of inherent
bias, an apparent result was that delays in the system
engineered by the doctors, in their self-defense, famously
allowed an inordinate number of patients to die before there
could be arbitration of their claims.252
249
Dominique Hascher, J., Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3
Issues, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 789, 792–798 (2012)
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1784&c
ontext=auilr&httpsredir=1&referer=; see also Joan Stearns Johnsen, Why Your
Arbitrator Is Biased, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Mar. 18, 2015),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/alternativedispute-resolution/practice/2015/why-your-arbitrator-is-biased/.
250
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29
MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 240 (1988); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About
Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting
of the National Academy of Arbitrators 1, 3–4 (1967); Silver-Greenberg, supra
note 164; Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (Cal.
1997).
251
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (Cal. 1997).
252
Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. Thus, in Engalla the California Supreme Court
considered whether such circumstances of disproportionate leverage renders an
arbitration agreement unenforceable. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. Patient
Engalla claimed Kaiser committed medical malpractice because its employees
were negligent in detecting and diagnosing Engalla’s lung cancer over the
course of several years. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. In accordance with the
terms of Engalla’s service agreement with Kaiser, the malpractice dispute was
sent to arbitration. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. Engalla made every effort to
comply with the Kaiser-designed arbitration system and seek a speedy hearing
because he was terminally ill from the undiagnosed lung cancer. Engalla, 15
Cal. 4th at 951. After Engalla died, with the medical malpractice dispute, not
having been heard by the tribunal, the Engalla family brought an action in the
California state court system. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. The Engallas alleged
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Similarly, in reference to bias and leverage, U.S.
investment houses have provided that arbitrators in
securities cases are required to be members of the National
Association of Securities Dealers.253 To the same unfair
effect, consumer contracts leveraged by large consumer
product producers include arbitration clauses waiving class
Kaiser’s self-administered arbitration system was corrupt and Kaiser
intentionally delayed the arbitration process so the hearing would occur after
Engalla’s death. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. The California Supreme Court
affirmed the policy of enforcing arbitration agreements, but stated that where a
party acts wrongfully and fraudulently, the enforceability of the arbitration
clause may be limited. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 951. The court’s finding was
that Kaiser’s arbitration program was “designed, written, mandated and
administered by Kaiser.” Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 962. Kaiser did not disclose
that it designed and administered the arbitration procedure to Engalla through
the arbitration clause in the service agreement, nor through any publications on
the procedure. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 962. Kaiser’s reserved control of the
arbitration system enabled Kaiser to repeatedly delay steps in the arbitration
process, such as the timeliness of selecting the arbitrators. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th
at 962. The arbitration agreement provided for each party to select an arbitrator,
then the two arbitrators select a third, neutral arbitrator. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at
962. “[I]n reality, the [neutral third arbitrator] selection is made by defense
counsel after consultation with the Kaiser medical-legal department. Kaiser has
never relinquished control over this selection decision.” Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th
at 965. The court further noted that the arbitration panel should have been
established within sixty days. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965. But, due to Kaiser’s
systemic delays, the process took three additional months, until the day before
Engalla’s death. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965. Evidence revealed these delays
were widespread and commonplace, and that Kaiser knew of the problem.
Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965. The California Supreme Court remanded the case
to resolve factual disputes related to Kaiser’s fraud. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965.
If the lower court found Kaiser was fraudulent, it could strip Kaiser of its ability
to compel arbitration. Engalla, 15 Cal. 4th at 965. Engalla, and the broad abuse
it exposed, thus demonstrates that where one party is completely autonomous
in its forum selection and arbitration procedures, critical unfairness, such as
delaying arbitration until a terminally ill patient dies, can result. Engalla, 15
Cal. 4th at 965.
253
Julia Kagan, National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasd.asp;
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
FindLaw Attorney Writers, NASD Arbitration of Securities Disputes,
https://corporate.findlaw.com/litigationCORPORATE.FINDLAW.COM,
disputes/nasd-arbitration-of-securities-disputes.html; Registration, Exams, and
CE, FINRA.ORG, https://www.finra.org/registration-exams-ce/individuals.
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actions and punitive damages, making the pursuance of
consumer claims economically unsupportable.254 Is there
neutrality when the mere designation of arbitration means
loss of the right of neutral disposition, as where certain
industries, applying their leverage against employees and
labor unions, insert arbitration clauses that limit the nature
and extent of the complaints that can be brought before the
arbitrator, thereby diminishing labor rights?255
An even more insidious unfairness than outright
bias or inherent leverage can result from the economic
interest of the arbitrator harnessed by a party who presents
the implied promise of repeat business as the reward for a
favorable result.256 This dynamic is entirely absent from
judicial litigation; however, in arbitration, it favors the party
who presents the greater potential for future business for the
arbitrator.257 The implicit economics of a dispute involving
an arbitrator with a once-only party on the one side and a
potential repeat customer on the other may bias results.258
This dynamic, sometimes identified as “the repeat player
advantage,” typically means favoring the large over the
small, the company over the consumer or employee, and
even the state over its citizens.259 The potential for the
operation of this dynamic in any particular case should
254
See generally Silver-Greenberg, supra note 164; see also Bingham, supra
note 250.
255
Bingham, supra note 250.
256
Meltzer, supra note 250, at 3-4 (1967); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RIGHTS AND EMP’T POLICY J.,
189 (1997).
257
Bingham, supra note 256.
258
Bingham, supra note 256.
259
See Bingham, supra note 256; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 164 (analyzing
the effects of arbitration across multiple industries, especially noting the
disproportionate leverage held by credit card companies, employers, and other
commercial entities); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size
Fits All” Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RESOL. 759, 767–71 (2001)
(distinguishing between arbitration practiced among repeat players, such as
merchants, and that between repeat players and one-shot players, such as
employees).

339

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2021

59

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 1
[Vol. 21: 281, 2021]

Arbitration With Government
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

certainly be taken into consideration by any lawyer before
choosing arbitration.
Additionally, as to the potential for bias in
governmental arbitration, arbitrators, counsel, and expert
witnesses in any given proceeding may have previously
worked on the same matters and crossed paths in one
professional context or another.260 This reality is not unique
to arbitration with government but is most pronounced
where there are concentrated communities of expertise
involved in particular areas of governmental activity.261
Arbitral systems, such as that of the American Arbitration
Association, are meticulous in requiring pervasive
disclosures that serve to police such associations that could
create conflicts of interest.262 The Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA) requires neutrality by prohibiting
any financial or personal conflict of interest.263 For
international arbitrations, the U.N. Commission on
International Trade Law is also exemplary in requiring prior
disclosure of any conflicts.264 However, the nature of
professional relationships and unconscious bias involved
may not be fully comprehended by objective standards,

260
See Drew Hushka, How Nice to See You Again: The Repetitive Use of
Arbitrators and the Risk of Evident Partiality, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION, 325
(2013); Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35, 21-23; see also
William Park, Arbitrator Bias, TRANSNATIONAL DISP. MGMT. BOS. U. SCHOOL
OF LAW 6–7, 24–31, 33–38, 45 (2015); Katherine Stone & Alexander Colvin,
The Arbitration Epidemic, ECON. POLICY INST. (Dec. 7, 2015),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/.
261
Katherine Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 77 N. CAROLINA LAW REV. 931,1015–1026 (1999); see
genrally Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35.
262
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, R-19(a),
ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION
(Oct.
1,
2013),
AMERICAN
https://adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf.
263
5 U.S.C. §§571-584 (current through Pub. L. No. 116–187).
264
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
International
Commercial
Arbitration,
art.
12,
7
(1985),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/19-09955_e_ebook.pdf.
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where there is past joint participation in a litigation.265
Arbitrators hired for their expertise in particular areas of
governmental regulation often confront the same counsel in
different cases, whether at the state or federal level.266
Indeed, as previously noted in relation to the
potential for compromise awards, the arbitrators are drawn
from the same communities as the lawyers appearing before
them.267 Litigation judges, though drawn from the same
professional communities as the lawyer appearing before
them, are prohibited from operating as an advocate or expert
witness through their entire service as judge, and are subject
to constraint from fraternizing with the advocates who are
before them or with potential witnesses.268 Arbitration is
more dependent on personal ongoing relationships, and the
nature of those relationships may cross over considerably
from social to legal.269 Because arbitrators are drawn from
the practice community in which they currently participate,
unlike the litigation judge who may be from that same
community but must cut ties, there is an ongoing natural
fraternity of interest for the arbitrator, and accordingly, a
more significant potential source of bias.270 In contrast to
the litigation judge, an individual who is appointed to
arbitrate your case may have also participated in relatively
265
Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35, 21-23; see also Stavros
Brekoulakis, Systemic Bias and the Institution of International Arbitration: A
New Approach to Arbitral Decision-Making, 4 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT
553, 556–57, 561–63 (2013).
266
See generally Hushka, supra, note 260; Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003)
UKHL 35.
267
See Park, supra note 260, at 6–7, 24–31, 33–38, 45 (2015); Stone & Colvin,
supra note 260; see also Hushka, supra note 260.
268
Judge as an Expert Witness, Opinion No. 139 (1991)
https://www.law.uh.edu/libraries/ethics/Judicial/jeao/101-200/jeao139.html.
269
Cole, supra note 259.
270
Thus in recognition of the subconscious bias this may engender, the British
House of Lords has held that lawyers who serve as part-time judges may not
appear as counsel before an Employment Appeal Tribunal, because that would
create a risk of bias and undermine public confidence regarding the
independence of arbitrators. Lawal v. Northern Spirit Ltd. (2003) UKHL 35,
21–23.
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current time frame as an advocate, consultant, or expert
witness (hired by the parties or by the tribunal itself).271
Often such ongoing experience is what is deemed to qualify
an individual to serve as arbitrator.272 This experience
presents a particularly rich potential for bias however long
the list of disclaimers of conflict of interest that may be
required by the arbitral forum.
iii. THE SALUTARY INFLUENCE OF
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY
Here, though, is the profound irony in arbitration
with Government, and potentially its saving grace. The
same community of interest that holds potential to bias the
arbitrator, can be an important source of support for the
realization of public policy.
Those who arbitrate
government contracts are a community of shared expertise
with kindred professional values born of common education
in the public policies involved in pertinent statutory and
adjudicative authority. As a sociological and political
reality, such communities of shared values and sensibilities
have been sometimes identified as “epistemic
communities.”273
271
As Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
observed, in choosing to arbitrate, “(t)here is a tradeoff between impartiality
and expertise,” and therefore the test for disqualification must turn on evidence
of the arbitrator’s impartiality. Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d
673, 679–80 (1983).
272
Merit, 714 F.2d at 166.
273
See Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992) wherein ‘epistemic
communities’ are defined as: “network(s) of professionals with recognized
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an
epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines
and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs,
which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community
members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain
and which can then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes (3); shared notions of
validity –that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and
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As a threshold matter when arbitration is employed
by government, there are the formal constraints of
disclaimers of conflict of interest required by virtually every
arbitral institution, which today can be quite detailed and far
reaching, purporting to cover all avenues of potential
conflicts of interest such as any of a wide variety of
relationships to the parties, or elements of self-interest.274
But shared interests and responsibilities can also by their
very nature engender therapeutic constraint against bias, and
the realization of socially beneficial public policy. Though
there is no review of the arbitrator’s judgment on the merits,
there is the informal constraint of the arbitrator’s
professional ethics and reputational concern, albeit related to
the arbitrator’s economic concern to be chosen for future
business.275 An able government counsel will advance any
governmental policy or fairness concern that can trigger the
arbitrator’s own sense of social responsibility and
reputational interest.
This, of course, indicates the
importance both of the choice of arbitrator, and the skills of
interpersonal diplomacy the lawyers and arbitrator bring to
the table in any given case.
Requirements of full disclosure through articulated
disclaimers of conflict of interest and pre-vetted arbitrator
lists can go a long way in enlisting this positive aspect of
shared policy concerns and interests. The Constitutional
illegitimacy of a proposed federal bureaucracy, as discussed
above, to determine when state public policy or the proarbitration policy of the FAA should prevail, does not
validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy
enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems
to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of
conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.” Haas,
supra.
274
See generally, Rogers, supra note 46; American Arbitration Association,
supra note 17; Singapore International Arbitration Center, SIAC Rules 2016
6th ed. (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.siac.org.sg/our-rules/rules/siac-rules-2016.
275
Garvey, supra note 222.
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preclude the inclusion of a bureaucratic authority to select an
arbitrator from among a list of those qualified by education
and experience to serve as the neutral decision maker.276
Indeed, for certain governmental arbitration U.S. statutes
and regulations so provide, by way of designation of a
governmental official with the authority to designate an
arbitrator from a pre-vetted official or unofficial list.277
There are also in service of the better aspects of
epistemic community interest, the shared standards of
professional ethics,278 rules of procedure to ensure
fairness,279 transparency and improved informational
resources for the selection of arbitrators, and increased
transparency for the challenge of arbitrators.280 Moreover,
major arbitral institutions have established training and
certification programs, which are often made mandatory for
would-be arbitrators.281
It is clearly in the interest of government lawyers to
support such developments. The party autonomy that is the
foundation of arbitration means that the government lawyer
is positioned to accomplish a great deal as to all provisions
to ensure fairness by selecting and demanding adherence to
these requirements of fairness as the sin qua non of the
choice to arbitrate.
276

Garvey, supra note 222.
See 5 U.S.C. § 577(a) (1990); 14 C.F.R. § 17.35 (2011), which provides that
the Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA), upon agreement of
the parties, may designate an ODRA Dispute Resolution Officer (DRO) to serve
as arbitrator, or alternatively that the ODRA make qualified personnel to serve
as arbitrator.
278
Rogers, supra note 114; American Arbitration Association, supra note 17.
279
See Emmanuel Jolivet, Access to Information and Awards, 22 ARB. INT’L.
265 (2006). This development importantly includes improving the efficiency
of arbitration as to time and cost; see also Harold S. Crowter & Anthony G.V.
Tobin, Ensuring that Arbitration Remains a Preferred Option for International
Dispute Resolution, 19 J. INT’L. ARB. 301 (2002).
280
See, e.g., Director General’s Review of 2006, London Court of International
Arbitration, 1 (2006).
281
Florian Grizel, Control of Awards and Re-Centralisation of International
Commercial Arbitration, 25 CIV. JUST. Q. 166, 167 (2006).
277
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There is also therapeutic value the parties
themselves can craft into the arbitral process, such as
stipulating for reasoned awards and their publication when
possible.282 This can serve importantly in minimizing the
risk of bias or the risk that important public policy will be
ignored. The government lawyer, given party autonomy as
the foundation of arbitration, can take the initiative to insist
on such requirements.
Providing for a reasoned award and its publication
establishes the opportunity to promote and enhance
predictability in all relevant arenas of governmental interest,
ranging from employer–employee relations to public–
private partnerships and social services. Even if not of
precedential value, such opinions can create at least informal
standards for regulation of virtually all areas of
governmental concern and regulation: such as in the
workplace, government, or commerce, setting guidelines for
economic development and social welfare in all its diverse
aspects. The requirement of a reasoned award, as articulated
and exploited by the government lawyer, can serve to engage
awareness of the arbitral tribunal that it will be compelled to
justify its award, can serve to motivate engagement and a
higher level of analysis and scrutiny than the mere issuance
of an award, and can force the arbitral tribunal to obtain
better knowledge of the law as the background for the award,
notwithstanding that the award is unsusceptible to reversal
on the merits.283 Exposure achieved by the requirement of a
fully reasoned and published award is indeed protection
against unprincipled decision, confronting the arbitral
tribunal with the prospect of critique compelling selfexamination and requiring justification.284
Such
accountability encourages well-reasoned decisions, as well
as providing a basis for the lawyers on both sides of the
282

Grizel, supra note 282, at 167.
Stephen Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vactatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 798–99 (1996).
284
Hayford, supra note 283, at 798–99, 841–42.
283
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dispute to better evaluate the quality of an arbitrator for
future selection, and for rejecting the incompetent.
The net result of a process subject to scrutiny, in
terms of the public perception and the public interest, is
greater legitimacy for arbitration and its results, and a greater
willingness to employ its advantages of more expeditious
dispute resolution than in the formal litigation system, while
achieving the cost savings that usually can be secured by
dispute resolution through arbitration.285 However, to
maximize the benefits, it is up to the government lawyer to
proactively articulate and refine the detail of desired award,
both in the drafting of the arbitration clause and later when
engaged within the arbitral process.
A proactive participation of the government lawyer
similarly can enhance the process by which the arbitral
tribunal deliberates the merits, most importantly in
achieving maximal transparency.
The demand for
transparency in all possible aspects, just as for a thoroughly
reasoned award, should be articulated in drafting the
arbitration clause and throughout the process. Transparency
and publication can also provide information for
policymakers for collaterally evaluating public law and
public administration.286 Moreover, it is the government
lawyer who is best situated to engage and promote the public
interest by encouraging and allowing information and
argument, such as through amicus filings by civil society
organizations and other affected third parties, especially
where there are significant impacts on third parties and
society at large, as for example, in cases of regulatory
takings.287 All this also can be accomplished in the drafting
of the arbitration agreement and creative interjection of the
285
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Curbing the Runaway Arbitrator in Commercial
Arbitration: Making Exceeding the Powers Count, 68 ALA. L. REV. 179, 185
n.22 (2016).
286
Amy Schmitz, Secrecy and Transparency in Dispute Resolution: Untangling
the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1238–41 (2006).
287
Schmitz, supra note 286, at 1238–41.
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government lawyer during the operation of the arbitral
process.
The government lawyer indeed can play a critical
role in ensuring the fullest transparency in the public interest,
by drawing on instruction other than from the domestic legal
system itself, instruction that is now available to be drawn
especially from international legal development.
Comprehensive guidelines to maximize transparency have
been fulsomely developed by way of standards recently
elaborated for international arbitration.288 Lawyers involved
in government contracting accordingly should be at the
forefront of articulating and requiring such standards. The
power to do so is inherent to the principle of party autonomy,
and the government lawyer engaging in arbitration possesses
the power to require these standards as the sin qua non in
drafting an arbitration clause or agreement.
There can surely be reasons to limit disclosure, but
such limitation should be specific to the case and the facts if
it is not to unduly subvert transparency. For example, the
arbitrator’s power includes making adequate provision for
protection of trade secrets or other concerns of competitive
advantage. But at least when the public interest is the
elephant in the room, which is generally the case when
government is arbitrating its disputes, the presumption
should be in favor of transparency.
Moreover, any lawyer or arbitrator joined in the
epistemic community of government lawyers and arbitrators
should appreciate the therapeutic value of adoption of the
procedural rules of a well-established arbitral system. Over
time these rules evolve to integrate concerns of fairness and
procedural restraints on discretion derived from what has
been learned from arbitrations gone wrong.
The
administering bodies of various arbitral systems typically
respond to complaints about process and modify their
288

See Trans-Pacific Partnership, supra note 50.
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procedures accordingly. There is a special safety in not
trying to reinvent the wheel by proceeding to arbitrate ad
hoc, but instead to rely on adoption of an established arbitral
institution and its corpus of established and tested standards.
There is, finally, a subtle but critical aspect to the
potential value of arbitration for the government lawyer that
goes well beyond the accounting for public policy as
embodied in statute or decisional law. Whether the
government attorney is engaged in arbitration in commercial
context or vis-a-vis other governments or representatives of
other governmental agencies, the matter of cultural
awareness is of special importance.289 Cultural sensitivity is
more likely of special importance for government attorneys
considering the choice of arbitration, rather than for private
sector attorneys, because of the different interests they
represent.290 In commercial arbitration, the parties—their
attorneys and the arbitrator—generally represent a
homogeneous cut of the national population, gauged in terms
of education, professionalism, or social class.291 In other
words, commercial arbitration, being commercial, is about
wealth—those who enjoy the advantages of wealth, and
those who have enough wealth to afford to be fighting about
it through legal process and lawyers.292 In arbitration
involving government, however, the government lawyer
represents the diverse interests of society at large.293 The
client base, for a government attorney—in the ultimate
respect of citizenship—includes not only the wealthy and
educated, but also the poor and middle class populations—
many of who are without the advantage of being able to
289
Theodore K. Cheng, Developing Skills to Address Cultural Issues in
Arbitration and Mediation, 72 DISP. RESOL. J. 1, 5 (2017).
290
Cheng, supra note 289.
291
Jaque I. Garvey, ARBITRATION INVOLVING GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES, 1 REVISTA ELETRÔNICA DA PROCURADORIA GERAL DO ESTADO DO
RIO DE JANEIRO 1, 17 [Elec. J. of the Attorney General of the State of Rio de
Janerio] (2018).
292
Garvey, supra note 291.
293
Garvey, supra note 291.
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employ lawyers to handle their disputes, many isolated and
alienated from the legal system.294
These parties and their interests, whether physically
participating in a given arbitration or not, may be detached
and alienated from the court litigation system—except as
represented by the government lawyer.295 The same is true
for the government lawyer in arbitration—who is by nature
of the office of government lawyers—charged with
defending and enforcing the public trust.296 The challenge
for the government lawyer in arbitration is to work on behalf
of a much more diverse population of interests than the
private commercial attorney, and to do so—for reasons here
explained—before a neutral third party not mandated by
public policy, but rather by party autonomy.297 Accordingly,
this mutually appointed third party is freer than the litigation
judge to ignore or respect the public trust.298 The greatest
challenge, therefore—especially for the government
attorney engaged in arbitration—is to represent those
members of society who are more outside the legal system
than within it.299 The need for legal representation of the
disenfranchised and disabled imposes a greater
responsibility for the government lawyer in arbitration.300
There are procedural means to best realize the
diversity of interests that the government lawyer should
represent. One technique that can be very effective to ensure
that the ruling of the arbitrator conforms to the societal
interests inherent in a dispute, is for the arbitrator, after
hearing on the merits—but before the rendering of the
award—to ask the parties themselves to provide the
arbitrator with a draft order of the result that would work best
294

Garvey, supra note 291.
Garvey, supra note 291.
296
Garvey, supra note 291.
297
Garvey, supra note 291.
298
Garvey, supra note 291.
299
Garvey, supra note 291.
300
Garvey, supra note 291.
295
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for their circumstances and constituency.301 This may well
produce results much more accommodative to the diversity
of interests involved—and for all the parties involved,
whether impacted directly or indirectly—than an arbitrator
ruling without a refined background of understanding of the
particular problems and potential solutions an award should
ideally reflect.
Relatedly concerning the social responsibility
implicit in arbitration with government, there is the
psychological dimension that a good lawyer should take into
account—that we all experience a selective and biased
process in our perception of external stimuli.302 This
“golden rule” has long been recognized—the lawyer
representing one side must stand in the shoes of the other.303
Recognition of the same difficulty appears in modern
psychology, by way of the evidence of selective perception,
whereby the same events can be interpreted very differently
by two individuals.304 We tend see what is familiar—i.e.,
what is personally and culturally most akin to our
community, whether cultural and/or professional.305 But as
the golden rule requires, representation requires empathy.306
For the government lawyer—who represents the large
national community of a more diverse mix of social class and
ethnic and cultural affinity than any lawyer in private

301

Garvey, supra note 291.
Garvey, supra note 291.
303
Garvey, supra note 291.
304
See, e.g., James W. Bagby, Cross-Cultural Study of Perceptual
Predominance in Binocular Rivalry, 54 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 331,
331–34 (1957). A classic study in which one eye of subjects from the United
States viewed, for a second, stereograms in which one eye was exposed to a
baseball game and the other to a bull fight. Supra at 331–34. The subjects from
the United States generally saw only the baseball game and the Mexican
subjects saw only the bullfight. Supra at 331–34.
305
See, e.g., Bagby, supra note 304, at 331–34.
306
Bagby, supra note 304.
302
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practice—the need to step into the shoes of the other is
especially a moral and psychological imperative.307
Social science literature and jury psychology
studies all indicate a fundamental truth about adjudicative
neutrality—that the more diverse the group that engages in
judgment (and therefore the more diverse the perceptions,
observations and opinions engaged), the more likely the
adjudicative body is to arrive at an objective assessment of
the facts and analysis.308 It follows that the government

307
See Guiguo Wang, The Belt and Road Initiative in Quest for a Dispute
Resolution Mechanism, 25 ASIA PAC. L.R. 1 (2017); see also Chris Horton, The
Costs of China’s Belt and Road Expansion, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/01/china-belt-roadexpansion-risks/604342/. An innovative example of how to provide for
maximizing cultural sensitivity in arbitration, is the provision for the “Blue
Book” for dispute resolution that has been made within the major “Belt and
Road” initiative of China. Wang, supra. This trade and investment initiative,
unveiled in 2013, seeks to facilitate and generate trade and investment across a
broad swath of Asia, by means of measures for a broad integration of
international trade between China and its neighbors, stretching through multiple
and diverse cultures. Wang, supra. These measures include, as importantly
embodied in The Blue Book, a new set of rules covering conciliation, arbitration
and appeal procedures, plus a set of transparency rules and code of conduct for
conciliators and arbitrators. Wang, supra. Most notably in relation to the
cultural challenges the Belt and Road initiative presents, the Blue Book permits
the parties to agree that “at least one arbitrator shall have specific professional
qualifications or expertise and/or understanding of local or regional culture and
practices.” Wang, supra. This is in addition to the qualification requirements
of objectivity, reliability and observance of rules of international conduct.
Wang, supra. Whether China’s aggressive trade expansion generates pushback
to China’s Belt and Road initiative that belies this accommodation to cultural
diversity is, of course, yet to be determined. Wang, supra.
308
See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE
IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 104 (Harv. Univ. Press ed., 1994) (citing, among other
studies, Nancy J. King, Post-Conviction Review of Jury Discrimination:
Measuring the Effects of Juror Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 (1993); JON
VAN DYKE, JURY SECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO
REPRESENTATIVE PANELS (Ballinger Pub. Co. ed., 1977); Shirley S. Abramson,
Justice and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 257–98 (1986); Samuel R. Sommers,
On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects
of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 597 (2006); DOAK BISHOP & EDWARD G. KEHOE, THE ART OF
ADVOCACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 519–581 (2d ed. 2010))
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attorney, seeking to represent society at large, should be
especially inclined to maximize the diversity of experience
and viewpoints available through arbitration. Therefore, a
government attorney agreeing to arbitration should seek to
appoint an arbitrator who has a diversity of experience, both
social and legal, and, where economically viable for the
parties, appoint more than one arbitrator to achieve the
greatest diversity of social and professional experience
available.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Ultimately, it is party autonomy, the source of
arbitral power, that controls arbitration to ensure that it
serves rather than undermines good government.309 Because
the arbitral process can be what the parties design it to be,
the government lawyer, who anticipates the concerns and
meets challenges here addressed, is best positioned to
minimize the risks to the public interest that arbitration
presents and to maximize its advantages.310
The foundational principle of party autonomy
empowers the government attorney to affect all aspects of
arbitration.311 This even includes, when appropriate and
desirable, rejection of arbitration for resolution of particular
aspects of a particular dispute, or its limitation through
exclusions to protect the public interest by narrowing or
limiting the issues to be arbitrated.312 Party autonomy
empowers the use of arbitration to achieve social good, so
long as the government lawyer appreciates the proactive role
that arbitration requires.313 Party autonomy makes possible
negotiation and stipulation as to virtually all substantive
(“[R]esearch indicates that when jurors of different ethnic groups deliberate
together, they are better able to overcome their individual biases . . . .”).
309
See Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25.
310
See Bockstiegel, supra note 57, at 25.
311
Garvey, supra note 222, at 444.
312
Garvey, supra note 222, at 444.
313
Garvey, supra note 222, at 444.
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rights and obligations, and remedies of the parties, and all
significant procedural aspects, whether presentation of
witnesses, confidentiality, cross examination, preclusion of
potential conflicts of interest and bias, and cultural
representation. Creative control through design of the
arbitral proceedings can include the most useful
requirements to serve the public interest at a significant level
of specificity; for example, even detailed requirements such
as concerning admission and use of expert witnesses and
whether the arbitral panel can call its own expert, or
witnesses, or conduct its own research.
As the examination here reveals, there is much that
can be accomplished by the government lawyer working
within arbitral process to serve the public trust. For the
government lawyer, therefore, arbitration is ultimately an
empowerment to serve the public interest.314 Success,
however, depends on the government lawyer’s in-depth
understanding of the complex opportunities presented within
the arbitral process and understanding where the critical
judgments in designing that process must be made. There
are no doubt risks. Arbitration, despite its advantages, may
override constraints that have enlightened the formal legal
system through lessons learned in evolving the formal legal
system towards better rule of law and justice.315 The
government lawyer and arbitrator, who appreciate the risks
but understand the capacities of arbitration to serve the
public good, can fill an important role in bringing that same
enlightenment to the alternative dispute resolution universe
of arbitration.

314
315

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614.
McConnaughay, supra note 117.
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